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 A nation attains democratic consolidation when democratic ideals become 
permanently established within its society. An institutionalized political party system is a 
prerequisite for democratic consolidation and is based on stable rules of interparty 
competition, parties with stable social roots, and party organizations independent of 
individuals ambitions. Additionally, all actors must accord legitimacy to a party system 
in order for it to be institutionalized. 
This thesis focuses on the political party system in Haiti and how its lack of 
institutionalization has undermined the consolidation of democracy. It also examines the 
factors that are responsible for this lack of development. Such factors include the actions 
of Haitian elites, lack of social organization, and a lack of party development during the 
earliest stages of state building. 
The impact of United States foreign policies upon this nations party system are 
identified to discover which policies have assisted party system institutionalization and 
which have hindered its development. While the entirety of Haitian political history is 
reviewed, an emphasis is placed upon United States policy since the 1991 ouster of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In conclusion, this thesis recommends future United 
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 A nation attains democratic consolidation when democratic ideals become 
permanently established within its society. An institutionalized political party system, 
which is based on stable rules of interparty competition and is accorded legitimacy by all 
political actors, is one of the prerequisites for democratic consolidation. 
In Building Democratic Institutions, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully argue 
that four conditions characterize an institutionalized party system: (1) stability in the rules 
and the nature of interparty competition; (2) major parties have stable roots in society; (3) 
major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to the parties; (4) 
party organizations are independent of individuals ambitions. Applying this framework, 
this thesis demonstrates that the political party system in Haiti has failed to attain these 
four conditions. It describes how this failure has undermined the consolidation of 
democracy in Haiti, both historically and particularly in the post-1990 period.   
In explaining why these conditions have not been met, this thesis identifies three 
primary factors that can inhibit party system institutionalization in any nation: a lack of 
social organization via shared interests such as those generated by religion or economic 
class; an absence of initial party development during the earliest phases of state building; 
the behavior of government elites, such as attempts to maintain power through political 
repression and corrupt practices. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine Haitis political system before and after Operation 
Uphold Democracy in 1994 and find that all three of these inhibiting factors are and have 
 xiv
been prevalent in Haiti. They must be overcome before an institutionalized political party 
system can be established and democratic consolidation attained.  
  The impact of United States foreign policies upon this nations party system are 
examined in Chapter 5 to discover which policies have assisted party system 
institutionalization and which have hindered its development. While the entirety of 
Haitian political history is reviewed, an emphasis is placed upon United States policy 
since the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. This chapter shows that due 
to the extent and severity of these factors undermining party institutionalization in Haiti, 
outside assistance is required, and the United States should continue to assist Haiti in 
accomplishing party system institutionalization. 
 Chapter 6 presents several recommended policy courses for the United States to 
follow in order to assist Haiti as it attempts to institutionalize its party system. In 
summation, the United States must acknowledge that past abuses of power still 
undermine the Haitian electorates confidence in political and economic elites. An 
institutionalization of the party system will almost assuredly have to come about 
gradually, since time will be required for all Haitians to develop trust and confidence in 
their party system.  
Additionally, efforts should be continued to develop Haitis stagnant economy, as 
this factor continues to social disorganization which greatly hinders party 
institutionalization. Currently, the Department of State is pursuing such policies through 
both diplomatic and financial assistance, and such programs should be continued. 
The final, and most critical, factor that Haiti must overcome is the corrupt and 
selfish interests of political elites. It is imperative that the United States continues its 
 xv
efforts to hold Haitian elites accountable to the ideals and rules of their democratic 
system in order for party system institutionalization to continue. Ultimately, however, 
while foreign assistance can help, Haitian political leaders themselves must be willing to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The election of President Aristide in December 1990 was a cause for much 
optimism in both Haiti and the rest of the international democratic community. Aristide, a 
Catholic priest and representative of the poor, was elected President of Haiti with an 
overwhelming majority of nearly 70%. All those involved, including international 
observers, acknowledged this election as being the first free and fair election of any type 
in modern Haiti. The era of authoritarian elitist politics had seemingly ended. This 
victory for Haitian democracy, however, would not last.  
On September 30, 1991, a military coup ousted President Aristide after only nine 
months of democratic rule. After the Presidents ouster, a ruthless military junta led by 
Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras ruled Haiti for over three years. His brutal regime came 
to an end only after a U.S.-led intervention led the way for Aristides reinstatement as 
Haitis President. Since the 1994 restoration of Haitis legitimate government, this 
nations embryonic democracy has performed dismally in many respects. How can this 
be explained?  
This thesis suggests that the lack of an institutionalized party system has 
contributed to the current difficulties in Haiti. It defends the theory that an 
institutionalized political party system must be developed if a fledgling democracy is to 
consolidate. Without such a party system, elites will be more likely to rule by exploiting 
populist support. Such leaders attain political office through their popularity with the 
masses and the promises they make during elections. The result is often a mix of policies 
and initiatives undertaken by a predatory leader with the goal of self-advancement and 
personal enrichment. Furthermore, without an institutionalized party system and socially 
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established parties, political participation and legitimacy suffer, as the will of the 
electorate is often not accurately reflected. Additionally, an institutionalized party system 
provides the basis for the necessary compromises that inevitably arise between political 
platforms in a democracy. 
Haitis lack of an institutionalized political party system has resulted in ongoing 
political turmoil, demonstrated by a parliamentary collapse and suspension following 
controversial legislative elections in 1997. Even in the past months, the lack of an 
institutionalized party system has created a schism between the ruling party and a 
democratic alternative that seeks political power outside of Haitis legitimate democratic 
system. Such actions hamper democratic consolidation, the process by which democracy 
becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to 
break down.1 
This scenario is present not only in Haiti. Throughout Latin America, as well as 
the rest of the world, powerful political elites unduly dominate ostensibly democratic 
governments where non-institutionalized party systems exist. In the past, such scenarios 
have hampered U.S. attempts to further democratic consolidation in Haiti and elsewhere. 
Any future U.S. efforts to promote democratization must include efforts to 
institutionalize weak or nonexistent party systems. 
The Haitian case is studied in order to understand the obstacles that non-
institutionalized party systems pose to democratic consolidation. In addition, the case 
                                                 
1 Diamond, 1996, p. 54. 
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offers insights into the possible contributions U.S. policy might make to party 
institutionalization. The thesis asks:  
• How institutionalized is the current Haitian political party system? How has this 
affected democratic consolidation? 
• What have been, and continue to be, obstacles to institutionalization? What 
actions can overcome these obstacles?  
• How has United States policy affected the development of institutionalized 
political parties in Haiti before, during, and after the 1994 intervention?  
Chapter II describes the functions parties perform in a democracy, explores the 
meaning of institutionalization, and delineates the requirements for an institutionalized 
party system. Then, in order to ascertain the difficulties encountered in forming an 
institutionalized party system within Haiti, this struggling nation is examined vis-à-vis 
factors that either inhibit or assist party institutionalization in any incipient democracy.  
Chapter III describes the Haitian political system, beginning from the fight for 
independence in the late 18th century to the 1994 U.S.-led military intervention. This 
chapter provides a background on the political history and culture of Haiti, a nation 
dominated by violent and ruthless leaders who cared little for either the will of the people 
or the rule of law. It clarifies how the past political environment prevented the emergence 
of institutionalized parties, the absence of which continues to haunt and handicap Haitian 
democracy. 
 This chapter then examines President Aristide and his personal political party, 
Lavalas. Aristide, a man whose personal charisma rapidly carried him to the presidency 
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in 1990, is the central figure in modern Haitis democracy. This chapter will examine 
how Aristides actions and relations with the other sectors of the government, including 
his own and other parties, contributed to political turmoil that ultimately resulted in his 
ouster. Ultimately, this chapter shows that Haitis non-institutionalized party system 
contributed to this chain of events.  
Chapter IV demonstrates that the Haitian party system has failed to achieve 
institutionalization since the 1994 intervention and chronicles how this has undermined 
the consolidation of democracy in Haiti. One of the primary factors behind this failure 
was the actions of political elites within Haiti. Primarily, both President Aristide and his 
opponents have been unwilling to make compromises in order to develop the necessary 
rules and framework of an institutionalized party system. 
Chapter V examines how the United States government has attempted to foster 
democratic consolidation worldwide, in Latin America, and in Haiti. An assessment is 
made of U.S. policy historically towards Haiti and in particular the impact of these 
policies on the institutionalization of the party system. The chapter then focuses on the 
impact of the Clinton administrations efforts to reestablish and then institutionalize 
democratic institutions, especially the party system, in Haiti following the ouster of 
President Aristide. Although U.S. efforts towards furthering the institutionalization of the 
Haitian party system have met with some success, much remains to be done, and the need 
for U.S. involvement in Haiti is as great now as it ever has been. 
Chapter VI offers recommendations for future U.S. policy towards Haiti. First, the 
United States should realize that the institutionalization of this nations party system will 
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require many years of involvement and cannot be achieved through short-term efforts. 
The United States also must provide further assistance towards ensuring that Haitis 
government offers a fair and balanced representative system in which both majority and 
minority interests are heard and incorporated into government policy. 
Additionally, the United States should maintain both financial and political 
support for Haiti in its efforts to improve the nations economic structure. Economic 
development will be crucial in order to overcome the lack of a middle class and an 
impoverished lower class, factors that have hindered party system institutionalization. 
Finally, the United States should continue in its efforts to hold Haitian elites 
accountable to the ideals and rules of a democratic system. The repressive and corrupt 
behavior of Haitian elites has more than any other factor inhibited party system 
institutionalization. All other efforts will be fruitless if the United States allows political 
elites to pursue their own limited and personal goals at the expense of their nations party 
system. Such actions will undermine not only the institutionalization of the party system, 
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II. INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEMS 
This chapter examines democratic consolidation and how political party 
institutionalization plays a critical role in this process. It reviews the functions parties 
perform in any democratic political system, such as providing an avenue for participation 
and aggregating interests. It then defines an institutionalized party system and the 
components thereof. Of equal importance, the factors that inhibit the development of an 
institutionalized party system are also examined. This framework will be used in 
subsequent chapters in order to evaluate the level of party institutionalization in Haiti, the 
factors that have contributed to this situation, and the impact it has had on democratic 
consolidation. 
A. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION  
Within the past decade, many nations that were formerly under authoritarian rule 
have been increasingly successful in embracing liberal ideals and adopting democratic 
governments. For example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union not only dealt a serious 
blow to international Communist ideology, but it was also the most important collapse of 
a non-democratic regime since the conclusion of the Second World War. Even before the 
revolutions of the early 1990s in Eastern Europe occurred, however, democratic 
movements in Latin America were already replacing repressive regimes. The collapse of 
Argentinas former military government in 1983 is an example of this phenomenon.  
Despite many transitions to democracy throughout the world, less progress has 
been made towards democratic consolidation. A concise definition of democratic 
consolidation is a wide-ranging process, by which democracy becomes so broadly and 
profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down. It involves 
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behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its 
uncertainty.2 Further clarified by Philippe Schmitter, democratic consolidation may be 
defined as:  
The process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential 
norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition 
into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, 
regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by those persons or 
collectivities (i.e., politicians and citizens) that participate in democratic 
governance).3 
 
Due to the complexity of this process, Schmitter acknowledges that consolidation 
as a whole is difficult to define or identify within any democracy. Therefore, it is often 
advantageous to break down democracies into their component parts, such as political 
parties or social movements, in order to examine how they each contribute to 
cooperation, competition, and voluntary acceptance. To this end, Schmitter offers a 
framework that demonstrates the various ways in which social groups are represented in a 
democracy, and have their ensuing conflicts resolved, through several different spheres or 
partial regimes such as trade associations, religion-based movements, and political 
parties.4 The development of each of these spheres is critical for a democracy to be 
successful. However, each of these elements requires a separate analysis of their impact 
on a nations level of democratic consolidation. This thesis focuses on the partial regime 
of political parties and how the institutionalization of this element is a prerequisite for 
                                                 
2 Diamond, 1996, p. 54. 
3 Schmitter, 1992, p. 158. 
4 Schmitter, 1992, p. 160. 
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democratic consolidation. The following section examines the contributions that parties 
make to the functioning of democracy. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN A DEMOCRACY 
Many scholars and political actors hold different definitions of what defines a 
political party and what are the most important aspects of such an organization. Some 
view parties in an idealistic light such as the British writer and politician Edmund Burke. 
In 1770, he declared, [A] Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint 
endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they all agreed. 
Others, however, see a political party primarily as a realpolitik tool for achieving political 
office. For example, in 1985, Joseph Schlesinger stated, A political party is a group 
organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to 
public office.5  
Political parties fit both these definitions, in addition to many others. Perhaps 
William Nisbet Chambers offered the best single definition of a political party. In 1967 
he stated,  
(A) political party in the modern sense may be thought of as a relatively 
durable social formation which seeks offices or power in government, 
exhibits a structure or organization which links leaders at the centers of 
government to a significant popular following in the political arena and its 
local enclaves, and generates in-group perspectives or at least symbols of 
identification or loyalty.6  
Clearly, based upon these different perceptions, political parties may serve many 
functions in a democracy, some obvious while others more sublime. This thesis, however, 
                                                 
5 Beck, 1992, p. 8. 
6 Beck, 1992, p. 8. 
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focuses on four main functions: establishing political participation, aggregating interests, 
instilling party discipline, and strengthening executive-legislative relations. Each of these 
important functions and their relevance to democratic consolidation is discussed in the 
following sections.  
1. Establishing Political Participation 
 
The stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of 
its political parties. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has 
institutionalized mass support.7  
 
 Political parties themselves are the essential elements of any effective party 
system, and while they serve many roles, their ultimate responsibility is to act as vehicles 
for mass political participation. Vigorous party recruitment for new membership allows 
formerly unorganized segments of society to share a common identity as they eventually 
consolidate into distinct political parties. This process in turn allows for the organized 
political representation of the masses within a government system, with each party 
serving as an enduring champion for a specific platform. 
Parties are able to mitigate barriers that would otherwise prevent most individuals 
from realistically competing for a political position. By providing organizational and 
financial resources and party name recognition, political parties allow capable individuals 
who are lacking personal wealth or a famous family name to compete for public office. 
Parties also allow for continued political involvement even when a partys opponent is in 
power, since parties possess independent bureaucracies that continue to function even 
when party representatives are not in control of a nations highest offices. This results in 
                                                 
7 Huntington, 1968, p. 408. 
 11
a constant challenge to the party in power, since an opposing political party provides the 
chance for opponents to remain politically active. 
Establishing political participation among a nations citizens is critical for many 
reasons, the most important being the attainment of democratic legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
attained when a significant percentage of the population accepts and has faith in the 
government, directly supporting the democratic ideal that the legitimacy of the 
government resides with the will of the people. While there is no mandatory level of 
voter turnout required to certify a democracy as legitimate, active and widespread voter 
participation is an indication of a widely accepted, and therefore legitimized, party 
system. Decreased voter turnout or wide shifts among voter loyalties vis-à-vis individual 
parties may signal that the legitimacy of both the party system, and possibly the entire 
democratic system, may be waning among a nations citizens. 
Securing popular participation through a party system is imperative in order to 
defend against those who would attempt to usurp political power through non-democratic 
means. A party system that only has the backing of a minority of the population is more 
vulnerable to overthrow by the military or other elites who can make credible claims to 
represent the people. Once political elites realize that the population would not recognize 
power achieved through any means outside of elections, any illegal attempts to attain 
political power become much less likely.  
2. Aggregating Interests 
In addition to facilitating political participation, parties also aggregate the 
interests of their members into cohesive and clearly defined platforms. This is important 
for a number of reasons. First, it permits parties to posses sufficiently concentrated 
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political power to affect policy, whereas small factions of society or most individuals 
would not be able to do so on their own. Second, it would be nearly impossible for 
elected representatives to reach a working compromise on any policy if there were as 
many viewpoints as there were representatives. Finally, these aggregated interests afford 
legitimacy to democracy, since the ideological platforms of elected representatives enjoy 
the support of many individuals instead of being the beliefs of a few individuals in power.  
Every citizen in a democracy has his or her own views on countless subjects that 
affect the state. Individual voices, however, are often insufficient in making any 
discernible impact on government policies. Fortunately, political parties are able to 
condense individual positions into effective, concentrated political efforts supported by 
the large numbers of voters within the organization. The compromises and positions that 
constitute a political platform will inevitably conflict slightly with some individual 
members ideas. Nonetheless, this fact is necessary and inevitable, as party platforms 
transform rabbles of voices into orchestrated party efforts often sufficiently powerful 
enough to influence change within the government.  
Although parties must respond to the changing wishes of their members, they 
must also maintain allegiance to their basic ideological platforms. By remaining 
ideologically stable, a party provides identifiable symbolism to its members and 
throughout society. While ideological platforms are shifted in response to party 
membership pressure, such philosophical changes must be gradual. Otherwise, parties 
may be perceived as abandoning their principles and in turn lose legitimacy throughout 
the body politic.  
 13
Membership in a political party serves as an easily identifiable beacon as to what 
a specific candidate or official believes in and what policies he will fight for on behalf of 
his constituents. Such a conceptual shortcut provided by a political party allows mass 
democracy to work effectively. In consolidating democracies with millions of people, it is 
optimistic to assume that the vast majority of voters will have an in-depth knowledge of 
each candidates platform and beliefs. Ultimately, if elective democracies are to succeed, 
the vast majority of voters must be able to vote with confidence not so much for 
individual candidates, but for the institutionalized political parties that they represent.8  
In a consolidated democracy, political parties are the main agents of 
representation for a nations citizens. Although parties have some control over deciding 
what issues make it on the national agenda, many other issues become controversial 
independently of party actions. If a party does not directly address and take part in the 
public debate over these issues, it will lose power to other parties that do. If all parties fail 
to aggregate these interests, they risk not only losing power but also delegitimize the 
entire party system and, with it, the system of elected government. 
3. Instilling Party Discipline  
In addition to aggregating citizens political interests, parties also instill discipline 
in and demand accountability from political representatives.9 The continued success of an 
elected representative often depends upon identification with, and the support of, a 
political party. By being a representative of a party, an official is identified with an 
established and commonly known ideology and purpose. Since their political fate is tied 
                                                 
8 See Mainwaring, 1995, p. 3. 
9 See Linz, 1992, pp. 188-190, for supporting and contrasting views concerning 
party discipline. 
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directly to that of the party organizations, they cannot stray too far from the party line 
without risking having their party confront or even abandon them. Such continuing 
commitment to a certain ideology is ultimately beneficial for the constituents of an 
elected official. This is so since through continued party obedience, a representative will 
not appreciably deviate from the policies that his constituency elected him to defend and 
pursue.  
Although they are the products of a democratic process, executives who come to 
power in the absence of an institutionalized party system often choose or are forced into 
taking actions that are detrimental to democracy. Since an executives political fate is not 
directly tied to the success of a party, and since he is not tethered to any party ideology, 
he is able to rule with little or no internal checks upon his power. He can make decisions 
that directly benefit his interests without fear of party retribution or appearing to be 
ideologically inconsistent. Conversely, however, he cannot depend upon a party for 
support. Without the support of an institutionalized party, such executives must seek to 
maintain their legitimacy by following immediate and popular policies that win the 
support of a base constituency while paying little heed to the long-range implications of 
their actions. 
However, when an executive represents an established political party, such an 
organization can check these potentially destructive executive actions. For example, 
political party leaders can greatly assist in instilling party discipline by controlling 
incumbents and candidates alike through their ability to withhold financial and 
organizational resources that are essential for effective election (and reelection) 
campaigns. Party leaders can also restrain unduly personalized actions of members once 
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in office by forcing party members in both the executive and legislative branches to 
account for party mandates when making decisions. Party leaders possess such influence 
by being able to withdraw organized party support for unacceptable initiatives, thus 
undermining the efforts of unfaithful party representatives.  
4. Strengthening Executive-Legislative Relations 
While instilling discipline and party accountability upon political leaders, parties 
can simultaneously promote strong relations between the legislative and the executive 
branches of a government. An institutionalized party system with viable parties can 
greatly increase the chances of efficient executive-legislative relations. A system with 
weak parties, however, can jeopardize the efficient interaction between the legislative and 
executive branches of a democracy.  
For example, a president or prime minister can seldom rely upon charismatic 
leadership, personal appeal, or even evangelical allure to provide continued political 
support from his constituents. While such traits are of great assistance during a campaign, 
and personal leadership qualities are always invaluable, sustained political support based 
on personal qualities and appearances is often fleeting once an individual is in office. 
Once saddled with the responsibilities of a government position, elected officials often 
discover that popular support wanes, particularly if circumstances force campaign 
promises to go unfulfilled. 
Even when an executive leader enjoys ongoing popular support, this is not 
automatically translated into the votes necessary for passage of initiatives in the 
legislature. Therefore, the support provided legislators from the executives party is often 
essential for three primary reasons. First, when an executives fellow party members in 
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the legislature concur with his policies or decisions, the votes they supply for these 
initiatives can often be the deciding factor towards its ratification. Second, it is almost 
always easier for an executive with party support to defend the merits of his positions 
against opposition parties since he alone does not have to absorb opponents criticisms 
and allegations. Finally, with often-inevitable objections emanating from opposition 
parties, an executive does not need additional criticism from his fellow party members 
undermining his initiatives. However, in order to achieve and retain party support in the 
legislature, executive initiatives must usually be consistent with the partys platform. 
Thus, the executive has incentives to cultivate party support, but what is the likelihood 
that he or she will be successful?  
Two primary reasons exist for legislators to cooperate with an executive from 
their own party. First, they share policy goals with the executive, codified in their partys 
ideology and mandate. When legislators find that a fellow party member is the nations 
chief executive, this situation offers an ideal opportunity to advance the party program. 
However, in order to achieve policy gains, party members must cooperate with the 
executive in order to ensure that party mandates are being pursued.  
The second reason for legislators to cooperate with the executive is that when a 
president is successful in pursuing his policies, his party colleagues in the legislature can 
benefit during the next election. For example, if an executive was supported by his party 
colleagues in the legislature and was able to implement his agenda successfully, he will 
almost always be seen as a leader who can deliver upon his promises. Such an image, 
with a supporting record to back it up, is invaluable during campaigns not only for the 
executive, but also for all of the representatives of the party. Therefore, in order to 
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advance the popularity and support of their party, in addition to having a strong executive 
campaigning on their behalf, legislators have a clear incentive to protect and promote 
their party colleagues in the executive branch.  
Thus, the executive and legislative representatives of a party have an incentive to 
cooperate and support the others initiatives, while simultaneously being wary towards 
trying to implement policies that party colleagues in both branches do not support. 
Through establishing mutual co-dependence between the branches of government, parties 
thus discourage policy initiatives designed for personal gain rather than for the good of 
the party, or even more importantly, for the good of the entire nation.     
In a weakly institutionalized party system, it is often more difficult for the 
executive and legislative branches to arrive at compromises acceptable to a majority. 
Instead, it is much easier for many fragmented parties to block executive-initiated bills. 
Additionally, legislators in a weak party system may be unable to provide the organized 
support often needed by executive leaders as they pursue their policy initiatives. 
Eventually because of an uninstitutionalized party system, executive-legislative relations 
and interdependence atrophy as the executive finds it necessary to operate nearly 
independently. When this occurs, other government actors such as the judiciary and 
regional leaders lose influence in the government as power is gradually consolidated in 
the hands of the executive branch or an individual leader.    
C. COMPONENTS OF AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEM  
The preceding section set forth reasons why institutionalized political parties are 
critical to democratic development and consolidation. This section describes the main 
characteristics of an institutionalized party system. Although there is no guarantee that 
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institutionalized parties will play the roles described in the preceding section, without an 
institutionalized party system they are practically guaranteed not to fill these roles. 
Huntington describes the institutionalization of any political organization as the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.10 An 
institutionalized party system is a set of patterned interactions in the competition among 
parties where procedures and organizations are well established, understood, and 
accepted as critical components of a stable electoral system.  
This definition is very similar to the definition of democratic consolidation, 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Such similarity is appropriate, for the institutionalization 
of a political party system is a process very similar to, and is an integral aspect of, any 
successfully consolidating democracy. This relationship exists since an institutionalized 
party system delineates procedures that result in electoral victors who can successfully 
claim to be the only legitimate leadership of their nation.  
In Building Democratic Institutions, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully argue 
that four conditions characterize an institutionalized party system: (1) stability in the rules 
and the nature of interparty competition; (2) major parties have stable roots in society; (3) 
major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to the parties; (4) 
party organizations are independent of individuals ambitions.11  
First, a party system is only as stable as its rules and the nature of interparty 
competition. Informal procedures and political compromises, such as cooperation 
                                                 
10 Huntington, 1968, p. 12. 
11 See Mainwaring, 1995, pp. 4-5. 
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between parties in approving cabinet members and other executive nominations, must be 
established. An irreconcilable impasse between parties can undermine an entire 
government. The development of such interactions is different for every nation, but 
critical nonetheless for stable competition.  
By definition, for stable interparty relations to exist, there must be more than one 
relevant party in a country. When a dominant single party excludes all others from 
effectively sharing in the political process, an institutionalized party system cannot exist. 
Such dominant parties often become state makers even to the point of becoming 
synonymous with the state.12 For example, during the former 71-year rule of the PRI in 
Mexico, the nation possessed an authoritarian democracy where the PRI became the 
electoral wing of the state.13 Other parties and political organizations are often stifled, 
and healthy competition breaks down as a single political organization dominates the 
executive branch, the legislature, and the government bureaucracy.  
As it is difficult for stable rules of interparty competition to emerge when a single 
party dominates, a party system can also be undermined when too many parties exist 
simultaneously. Each democracy is different, so there is no universal limit as to how 
many parties should exist in any particular country. Nor is a two party system, as is the 
case in the United States, necessarily the most suitable structure for any other given 
country.14 However, an excess of parties can be said to exist when public support is so 
                                                 
12 Lopez-Alves, 2000, p. 7. 
13 Sherman, 2000, pp. 146-147. 
14 For a concise analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of both two-party and 
multi-party systems, see Lijphart, 1999, pp. 62-64. 
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widespread between multiple parties that the resultant cacophony of political views 
makes it extremely difficult to arrive at compromised solutions via the party system. This 
type of chaotic political environment invites actors to attempt non-democratic bids at 
attaining power, such as through military coups, since the existing party system is 
seemingly unable to provide leadership for the nation. 
An excess of parties can also undermine the second requirement of an 
institutionalized party system: the necessity for major parties to establish stable roots in 
society. Voters need to become familiar with a few enduring parties and know what their 
general platforms are. If new parties emerge during every election, or if there is a 
proliferation of parties as is the case in some Latin American countries, the electorate is 
likely to be unfamiliar with their platforms and ideologies. Under such circumstances, it 
can be very difficult for citizens to support a party, its platform, or its candidates with 
confidence. Resultantly, voter turnout can suffer due to frustration and a lack of 
information, and even many of those that do participate may not make informed 
decisions. Clearly, for these reasons the endurance of major parties within a nation is a 
cornerstone of party system stability. 
In addition, the conviction with which parties pursue and defend their platforms 
produces stable roots in society. This is accomplished as stable parties provide the 
necessary symbolism required by average citizens in order to make informed decisions as 
to what policies their representatives believe in and support. If existing parties constantly 
undergo significant position shifts, a stable system no longer exists, as such changes 
 21
imply weak ties between parties and society and an irregularity in how parties compete 
and relate to social actors.15  
However, political parties must not be overly static concerning their ideology as 
they attempt to develop stable roots in society. Parties must be flexible and adapt to social 
changes by being able to shift gradually their ideological positions in accordance with the 
demands of the partys members. Only through an accurate portrayal of their 
constituents beliefs can parties retain their legitimacy as faithful representatives within 
the party system. In essence, party leaders must establish equilibrium between being a 
representative of members views, while also remaining independent of being overly 
swayed by such voices to the point where they are unable to adapt to new circumstances. 
The third condition for the existence of an institutionalized party system is 
straightforward, yet its achievement is critical. In order for a party system to be 
institutionalized, major political actors must accord legitimacy not only to the electoral 
process, but also to the nations political parties. In particular, political elites must 
recognize that parties are key actors in determining access to power.16 Clearly, if such 
actors do not recognize the legitimacy of their nations parties, there is a greater chance 
that other means of attaining political office, such as through populist/evangelical 
mandates, nepotism, or even violence will instead become accepted norms. Such a 
situation not only undermines the party system, but also can potentially compromise the 
free and fair execution of the electoral process. 
                                                 
15 Mainwaring, 1995, p. 5. 
16 Mainwaring, 1995, p. 5. 
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Finally, in an institutionalized system, parties are independent organizations that 
are not subordinate to the selfish interests of overly ambitious party members. 
Institutionalized parties are dependent upon their capacity to persist apart from or 
beyond the political fortunes of a leader who creates and dominates them temporarily.17 
Without such autonomy, individuals would have the ability to influence unduly their 
party, along with its positions and ideology.18 The public disgrace of a party 
representative would lead to the discrediting of the party rather than just the individual. 
Truly institutionalized parties continue to exist after powerful leaders and supporters 
leave the political stage. Thus, autonomous party organizations, not elite individuals, 
ensure the continued institutional integrity of the political party system. 
In addition to independence from individuals, institutionalized parties are also 
autonomous from political movements or other social forces that may have either 
originally established them or continue to provide support due to shared ideological 
beliefs. This independence is necessary in order to ensure that parties are allowed to 
adapt their positions and compromise as required in order to conform to the changing 
demands of party voters. Political parties must persevere for many years in order to 
become fully integrated into society, and the only way that parties can survive for 
extended periods is by being flexible and adapting to inevitable social changes. Such 
adaptability is not possible if a party is overly dependent upon the support of any other 
political movement or organization. 
                                                 
17 McDonald, 1971, p. viii. 
18 See Alexander, 1973, pp. 4-6, for a short summary of the history and 
persistence of personalist parties in Latin America. 
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Not only are institutionalized parties independent ideologically from individuals 
and various political movements, but such parties also have independent financial 
resources outside the control of other political actors. Such freedom ensures that 
institutionalized parties are not unduly pressured through financial means to adopt 
policies they would otherwise not.  
Where weak parties exist, elitist rule in the hands of a few, or even a single 
individual, often prevails. This scenario enables influential individuals, both inside and 
outside of the government, to manipulate and unduly control the workings of the state.19 
Candidates are more likely to run their campaigns, and citizens are more likely to vote, 
based upon populist slogans and promises that do not adhere to any developed set of 
political policies.  
Why are such dilemmas present in some nations and not in others? The next 
section discusses the factors that negatively affect the development of an institutionalized 
party system.  
D. FACTORS INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEM 
Multiple factors can inhibit the institutionalization of a party system, which in 
turn hampers democratic consolidation. However, this section will limit its examination 
to three of the most common inhibiting factors and the effects these have had upon many 
nations during their struggle to attain democratic consolidation.  
This thesis argues that the following three factors inhibit the institutionalization of 
political party systems: 
                                                 
19 See Mainwaring, 1995, p. 478. 
 24
1. A lack of organization in society around shared interests such as those 
generated by religion or economic class; 
2. An absence of initial party development during the earliest phases of state 
building; 
3. The behavior of government elites, such as attempts to maintain power 
through political repression and corrupt practices. 
Each of these three factors either directly or indirectly undermines the previous 
sections four components of an institutionalized party system. For example, existing 
organizations and shared interests among segments of the population often facilitate the 
efforts of parties to attain stable roots in society by allowing parties to incorporate easily 
large segments of society directly into their ranks. Whether such pre-organized parts of 
society are founded in a common religion, profession, or interest, the preexisting order 
and structure inherent of social groups allows for the rapid and effective incorporation of 
these groups into a political party. 
Labor unions are a prime example of how existing organizations can be adapted 
into political parties. In the case of unions, they provide a superb foundation upon which 
to build disciplined and centralized worker-based political parties.20 Such working-class 
parties, often with mass membership, develop because the many industrial laborers 
within a given nation often have three very important aspects of their lives in common. 
The first is that they all share very similar political interests, such as safe working 
                                                 
20 For an in-depth analysis of how several Latin American party systems have 
incorporated organized labor into the democratic process, refer to Collier and Collier, 
1991, pp. 161-168. 
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conditions and decent wages. The second aspect is that they are all living and working in 
close, usually urban quarters, where it is easy for labor party leaders to organize and 
communicate with their constituents. This fact leads to the third similarity: in many 
nations, a large majority of skilled workers are in unions, which parallel and in many 
instances are synonymous with political parties in their purpose. The often-ensured 
solidarity of union laborers at the voting booth makes their inclusion into political parties 
a very effective counterforce to aggregated elite interests. 
However, when a democratizing nation faces stagnant or non-existent economic 
development, an organized work force is difficult to develop, and therefore it is 
extremely difficult to institutionalize either labor unions or working class political parties. 
In non-industrialized nations where the majority of the working class either is employed 
through agriculture, involved in menial labor, or is unemployed, labor unions and other 
organizations within society are not as strong as in an industrialized society. Individuals 
from lower classes have more dispersed and varying interests, making it more difficult to 
organize these citizens politically. Thus, the interests of these sectors of society are often 
neither well aggregated or well represented in the political system. Where labor unions 
and other organizing bodies do not exist, working class political parties must expend 
more efforts and resources in establishing some kind of common trend among this class. 
Furthermore, this situation is more likely to make this segment of society much more 
vulnerable to populist appeals of charismatic individuals posing as political saviors.  
In addition to labor unions and other working class-based organizations, middle 
class groups might form the basis for the formation of political parties. Members of the 
middle class often share interests that usually differ from those of the elite, thus providing 
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an incentive to organize as a party. Furthermore, many Latin American parties based in 
the middle class often develop support from the unorganized lower classes by making 
clientelistic appeals. This tactic can be successful if such parties are able to spread their 
pork barrel promises and convince the masses that they can deliver on their promises.21 
In addition, middle class-based parties can also attain lower class support via non-class 
ideological grounds, such as nationalism, religion, or a host of other issues. In either case, 
a politically active middle class increases the chances that non-elite parties will form and 
serve as a central channel for representation of interests. 
Unfortunately, when modern economic development stalls or never begins, a 
bipolar distribution of wealth occurs. Specifically, a great deal of wealth is concentrated 
in the hands of a few, while the percentage of impoverished citizens increases. Often, the 
result is the dissolving of the middle class, as all except for a few elite are unable to 
maintain their economic positions in society.  
Furthermore, without a developed economic sector, a nations political structure 
will also tend to be weak since poor national economic performance eventually tarnishes 
a governments legitimacy. Regardless of whether or not a nations financial straits are 
the result of government mismanagement, if a nation experiences continued economic 
depression, the governments ability to lead will increasingly be called into question. In 
such an environment, political parties will frequently come to power and then lose 
support as a result of their inability to govern. Such was the case of Peru in the 1980s, 
where the inability of Presidents Fernando Belaunde and Alan Garcia to solve the 
                                                 
21 See Dix, 1989, pp. 26-27 for a further examination and previous examples of 
this trend in Latin American. 
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nations increasing economic difficulties were key factors that undermined popular 
support for both of their parties. In turn, this loss of confidence in these major parties 
undermined the entire party system, encouraging Peruvians to look outside of existing 
institutions and instead to the savior of the authoritarian Alberto Fujimori.22  
In the case of the second factor undermining party institutionalization, if a 
political party system is not in place during the initial state building process, the 
bureaucracy will tend to usurp the mediating role between state and society that parties 
usually play. In contrast, if parties emerge as principal agents of interest aggregation and 
representation before major state expansion, actors are likely to pursue their objectives 
through parties.23 The longer that a bureaucracy is operational without a significant party 
presence, it will become increasingly more difficult for parties to develop and for a 
system to institutionalize. This dilemma will usually occur since actors become used to 
fulfilling their interests through direct appeals to the state apparatus, such as the executive 
and military bureaucracies, instead of through either parties or the legislature.  
Furthermore, when parties do emerge, they will more likely be oriented toward 
clientelistic politics since they can rely on state resources rather than their own 
organizational efforts to gain votes. An example of this practice would be the distribution 
of state resources to constituents in order to remain in power instead of having to 
organize support based on policies. Such a situation leads to increased corruption, a lack 
of representative political parties, and a barrier to democratic consolidation. 
                                                 
22 See Roberts, 1998, p. 203. 
23 See Daalder, 1996, pp. 58-64 for further analysis of this theory. 
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Finally, behavior of government elites such as political repression and corruption 
is the third and final factor that can inhibit party system institutionalization.24 Often, 
when a nation is trying to transition to democracy, the entrenched elite can be unwilling 
to surrender their political power and will act to prevent its loss. Sometimes the only way 
in which an undemocratic regime can retain power is through political repression, 
accentuated with threats, violence, and the outlawing of opposition parties. 
Such actions directly result in the lack of an institutionalized party system by 
destroying the faith a nations population has in the ability of the democratic system to 
represent and defend the lives of non-elites. It is very difficult for individuals living in 
fear of their own government to believe that non-violent political actions can have any 
effect. In addition, it is difficult for parties to organize and share different political ideas, 
when anyone engaging in such activity is met with violence originating from the ruling 
regime. Parties go either underground or go into exile; neither is conducive to 
developing stable roots in society. Many political parties are unable to survive in such an 
environment, and when such repression is at last ended in a society, they are often unable 
to organize citizens and aggregate their interests as the transition to democracy begins. 
Corruption originating from a nations elite can also inhibit the institutionalization 
of the party system. When an opposing representative is bribed to switch parties by 
entrenched elites or blackmailed in order to further the interests of a powerful few, both 
the individuals party and his constituents are betrayed. The loss of public trust in such an 
official and his party can seriously jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire party system. 
                                                 
24 For an examination of Elitism as an enduring trend in Latin American 
political parties, see McDonald, 1971, p. 8. 
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Inversely, elite actors can also have a positive and immediate effect on party 
system institutionalization. While it is impossible to change a nations history, and levels 
of societal organization can take years and sometimes decades to change, elite behavior 
can sometimes be modified rather quickly, resulting in near-instantaneous improvements 
to the system. The most important of these efforts is the most straightforward: elites must 
be willing to surrender their personal power to institutionalized parties. As argued by 
Mainwaring and Scully, such action is sine qua non if democratic consolidation is to 
proceed and an institutionalized party system is to survive. In order to assist further in 
their development, however, elites can take positive action by publicly supporting the 
party system and becoming leaders within a party themselves. 
The following chapter examines Haitis political system prior to the most recent 
installation of democracy in 1994 and shows how personalized, absolute rule, supported 
by violent political oppression, has undermined significant party system 
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III. HAITIAN PARTY SYSTEM BEFORE 1994 INTERVENTION 
For a variety of internal and external reasons far too complex to address 
here, Haiti did not fare well over the last 200 years 
From Haiti Handbook for US Personnel25  
 
A. HISTORICAL SITUATION 
Haitians have almost always been dominated by leaders who govern by brutal 
oppression. Just as their European masters oppressed the slaves of colonial Haiti, this 
nations citizens would not be truly free even after their independence. The twentieth 
century did not improve matters for Haiti, for whether it was a twenty-year U.S. 
occupation or an even longer period of violence under the Duvalier regime, Haiti seemed 
destined to live under authoritarian rule. However, in 1986 the Duvaliers fled, followed 
by chaotic yet optimistic increases in political freedom. Finally, in 1990, after almost two 
centuries of near-continuous oppression, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President.  
Many factors, both foreign and domestic, have strangled democratic ideals and 
hindered the development of democracy in Haiti. This chapter examines the historical 
factors that have undermined the development of an institutionalized party system in 
Haiti. It concludes by showing how the weakness of political parties contributed to the 
rise and subsequent fall of President Aristide and the collapse of what had been a 
promising step towards consolidated democracy.  
 1. Early Haitian History 
Haitian independence, like that of many Latin American nations, was the product 
of a bloody and chaotic rebellion against an imperial European power. From 1790-1804, 
armed conflict against French and other European forces, along with political and cultural 
                                                 
25 von Hippel, 2000, p. 96. 
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tensions among blacks, whites, and mulattos, beset the island of Hispaniola. Although 
Haiti eventually became an independent state in 1804, political and economic chaos 
remained nearly constant until the early twentieth century. As Smith argues, this turmoil 
was the result of, 
Crosscutting cleavages and dichotomies that divided the Haitian people 
and undermined national unity. Class antagonisms were reflected in the 
divisions between French-speaking and Kreyol [Creole]-speaking 
populations, black and mulatto color distinctions, Roman Catholic and 
Vodun [Voodoo] religious groups and power struggles.26  
 
Although Haitians had rid themselves of colonialism, they were not able to escape 
oppression. Haitis new leaders exploited their positions and turned the hemispheres 
richest colony into the poorest country as continuous civil wars and brutal dictatorships 
devastated the nation. Unlike in post-revolutionary France, democratic ideals never took 
hold in Haiti. Instead, during the nations early history, politics were dominated by the 
numerically small elite, and by a succession of military strongmen who controlled the 
presidency.27  
The military involvement in Haitis political system initially developed out of an 
immediate sense of national security. Fearing French military retribution, the newly 
independent nations initial concern was defending against an invading force bent on 
retaking the colony. The military leaders of the revolution constructed numerous 
fortifications along the Haitian coasts while retaining political power in order to defend 
the nation against a possible invasion. In 1805, an imperial constitution consecrated 
military control over the government, as the perceived necessity of living under a 
                                                 
26 Bellegarde-Smith, 1990, p. 70. 
27 Schmidt, 1971, p. 26. 
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militaristic rule forestalled any development of ideals. The merging of the military and 
the government would last until 1913 and would foreshadow nearly two centuries of 
militarism in Haiti.  
The necessity for the various military governments to control the vast numbers of 
recently freed slaves was another factor that accounted for the embracing of an 
authoritarian regime early in Haitis history. For although the ruling class, freed slaves, 
and slaves themselves had banded together to fight a common enemy during the 
revolution, the elite intended to maintain strict control over the former slaves following 
independence. In order to maintain political and economic control over the masses, a 
strong, centralized government based in Port-au-Prince developed.  
Simultaneously, a system of feudalistic caudillismo developed throughout the 
countryside, where former slave owners and military officers assumed the responsibility 
of overseeing their workers in arrangements similar to the old slavery system. In short, 
Haitian governments have historically maintained their power and have enriched 
themselves by taking advantage of the poor peasants. Resultantly, Haitis rural areas, 
where the majority of the population lives, traditionally has benefited least from 
government expenditures, and they have suffered for the past 500 years from virtually 
uninterrupted military domination.28 In such a situation, where the elite rulers were 
primarily mulattos, and the poor were almost entirely black, racial tensions concurrent 
with class divisions arose. In essence, little had changed for the majority of Haitians; their 
political freedoms in the post-independence period were only marginally improved over 
the total lack of liberties that marked the colonial slavery system.  
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Civilian involvement in the Haitian government began in earnest during the mid-
nineteenth century as international merchants began to enter Haiti. By the late nineteenth 
early twentieth centuries, foreigners, especially from the United States, Europe, and the 
Middle East, comprised over half of all businessmen in Haiti. They were especially 
involved in the critical fields of banking and import-export shipping. Resultantly, an 
increasing number of upper and middle-class Haitians were chased from their jobs and 
forced to make a living in the lucrative field of politics. This profession was not 
lucrative due to high salaries; instead, political office offered the opportunity for self-
enrichment through corrupt practices.29  
By the 1880s, this influx of Haitians into politics resulted in the emergence of the 
first political parties, the Liberal and National parties. Although this step was critical for 
democratic development, both parties were very similar in their representations of upper 
class, hegemonic interests. Despite their frequent and violent confrontations, these two 
parties represented only slightly different elitist viewpoints. While this was typical of 
initial party systems in many Latin American nations, elitist parties in other countries 
eventually incorporated the lower classes directly or permitted parties that did so. This 
did not occur in Haiti, as the parties ignored the increasingly outspoken demands of many 
poor Haitians. 
Instead, what happened by the end of the nineteenth-century in Haiti was the 
opposite of a social contract. The reaction of the urban elites to the rise of the peasantry 
was to turn away from anything that would resemble a package of entitlements for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Library of Congress, Haiti, pp. 1-2. 
29 See Bellegarde-Smith, 1990, p. 67. 
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majority. Rather, the choice was to turn to a system of social apartheid.30 Resultantly, an 
almost total lack of institutionalization occurred as the vast majority of political interests 
were not represented in, nor benefited from, this party system. By the time the U.S. 
Marines landed in 1915, the elites and those working within the government had learned 
to live only at the expense of the nation.31  
2. U.S. Occupation, 1915-1934 
Haiti did not enjoy a stable government until 1915 when the United States 
dispatched Marines to establish a constabulary government. Such action was not 
unprecedented; U.S. troops had intervened in Haiti during the last half of the nineteenth 
century on nineteen separate occasions. The immediate causes of the occupation were 
both economic disputes: the first was between the Haitian Banque Nationale and the New 
York National City Bank, the second was between the Haitian government and the U.S.-
owned Haitian National Railroad. The United States would achieve its goals by 
effectively taking over the Banque Nationale and forcing Haiti to pay enormous costs for 
National Railroad projects, while simultaneously establishing a puppet government that 
was pliant to these and other demands.32 
However, increased government repression was the required price for political 
and economic stability. During the occupation, Washington and its proxy government in 
Port-au-Prince controlled the Haitian people via the state bureaucracy and stymied the 
development of democratic participation in the political system. For example, the Haitian 
                                                 
30 Trouillot, 1997, p. 52. 
31 Trouillot, 1997, p. 52. 
32 See Schmidt, 1971, Ch. 3, for a more thorough review of this period. 
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legislature was dissolved when it would not adopt a constitution drafted by the U.S. 
Department of State (DoS). Inevitably, the U.S.-controlled government accepted policies 
that allowed foreign investors to become rich at the expense of the poor, rural Haitians.33  
Because of the continued U.S. presence, a heretofore-unseen nationalist 
movement arose. In order to silence these opponents, the Haitian government often used 
its U.S.-trained and supported military. Even after the Marines left in 1934, the 
empowered elite continued repressive practices, lest the increasingly disproportionate 
poor rise in revolution as their ancestors had in the late eighteenth century. Such actions 
only intensified already existing divisions between the classes.  
During the occupation, Haitian politicians further deluded themselves that their 
positions were legitimate offices and not avenues of self-enrichment. The rich were also 
able to rationalize their corruption by asserting they were the descendents of the pre-
revolutionary Creole elite and therefore had a predestined right to rule and exploit the 
masses. The middle class intelligentsia, on the other hand, saw themselves as the 
vanguard of the black working class. However, once in office, many such officials 
focused exclusively on maintaining their positions for as long as possible and quickly 
forgot about the plight of their impoverished constituents.34 Such corrupt attitudes still 
exist, and overcoming this dilemma will require time and extensive effort on the part of 
all Haitians and any outsiders who would assist them. 
In 1934, U.S. forces pulled out of Haiti and Washington returned control of the 
Banque Nationale to the Haitian government. Nonetheless, during their two decades of 
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occupation the Marines had successfully crushed a series of bloody insurgencies and had 
forced U.S. policies upon the Haitian government. Additionally, the United States 
overhauled Haitis disintegrating military infrastructure in an attempt to establish a 
modern, apolitical military force.35 Although on the surface the U.S. military had 
succeeded, what they did not know was that this newly disciplined and modernized army 
would be used by the following regimes to oppress domestic political opponents.  
3. Post-Occupation Years and the Duvalier Regimes 
After the U.S. departure, Haiti experienced eleven years of repression-based 
political stability via military regimes. Some political organizers attempted to define and 
institutionalize the incipient left-wing political parties, such as the Worker-Peasant 
Movement (MOP) and other Socialist and Communist parties. However, the elite 
controlled the government and stymied the development of democratic participation in 
the political process. As in other countries where the United States intervened, power was 
increasingly concentrated in the executive branch and the army.36 Resultantly, 
conservative, elite-oriented interests successfully ruled the political system as the 
government utilized its U.S.-sponsored army to stifle all dissent and further centralized 
political and economic power in Port-au-Prince at the expense of the provinces.37  
Authoritarian regimes maintained an elite-centered status quo until 1946, when a 
military coup brought President Dumarsais Estime to power. As a rural black, Estime 
did not maintain the elite control the U.S. occupation was supposed to ensure and 
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[instead] tried to reconcile color and class antagonisms from an earlier age.38 Estime 
legalized left-wing parties, as his regime marked one of the most progressive periods in 
Haitian politics. However, he would eventually cave into U.S. anti-leftist pressures and 
ban socialist parties along with establishing strict control over unions and student 
organizations. When Estime fell out of favor with virtually every sector of Haitian 
society, as well as losing U.S. support, he was exiled via a military coup.  
President Paul-Eugene Magloire, a leading general of the junta and an elite black, 
replaced Estime in 1950. Magloire ruled Haiti for six years and maintained a quiet, elitist 
status quo. He attempted to extend his six-year presidency, however, and was driven out 
of office and forced into exile by the same army that he had led in the previous coup. 
Despite his relatively calm tenure, upon his departure from office Haiti experienced a 
level of political chaos not seen since before the U.S. occupation. During the 1956-1957 
period after Magloires exile, Haiti experiencing five governments within six months. 
One leader, MOP President Daniel Fignole, lasted only nineteen days before a military 
junta deposed him. Three days later, troops and police massacred approximately one 
thousand protesting Fignole supporters.39  
Clearly, this situation drastically damaged the legitimacy of the Haitian political 
system. Fortunately, however, the political system eventually stabilized to the point 
necessary for the scheduling of September 1957 presidential elections. This tumultuous 
period was very similar to the years immediately before the 1915 intervention, and in 
similar fashion, the United States became involved. The U.S. felt that Haiti needed a 
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middle-class, middle-of-the-road reformer, and of all the candidates, Dr. Francois Papa 
Doc Duvalier, a country physician, was perceived as the best choice.40  
Duvalier, a middle-class black and a cabinet minister under the progressive 
Estime regime, had the support of nearly every sector of the Haitian political spectrum, 
including the poor masses, the intelligentsia, and most of the army officer corps. Most 
importantly, however, was the support of the United States: the State Department, the 
Agency for International Development (AID), and other U.S. actors both overtly and 
covertly supported his campaign efforts. 
Duvalier won the 1957 democratic election under suspicious circumstances, but 
the majority of Haitians greeted him as the legitimately elected president, glad simply to 
have what appeared to be a stable, liberal leader. However, Duvaliers non-democratic 
actions, beginning approximately six months after his election, dispelled any hope for a 
stable democracy as he quickly asserted himself as one of the most ruthless dictators in 
Latin American history. As stated on the official website of Haitis U.S. Embassy, The 
corrupt Duvalier dictatorship marks one of the saddest chapters in Haitian history with 
tens of thousands killed or exiled.41  
Haitis modern political history begins with Papa Doc, since it is during his 
reign that all political opposition was crushed through violent intimidation, in effect 
wiping the democratic slate clean. As explained by one correspondent, the Tonton 
Macoutes were the regimes notorious private army that accomplished this feat. Blessed 
with Duvaliers fearful, near-supernatural personal power, these assassins were voodoo-
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linked authorities who maliciously crushed political dissidents and opposition figures, 
instilling fear into all Haitians towards them and the entire Duvalier regime.42  
In 1964, Duvalier declared himself President-for-Life, and would retain this post 
until his death in April 1971. Duvalier was replaced by his son and personally designated 
successor, 19-year-old Jean-Claude Baby Doc Duvalier, who would continue the reign 
of political oppression and terror until 1986. In all, an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 
Haitians were murdered during the combined Duvalier era.  
The role of modern Haitian political parties begins during Baby Docs reign. By 
the time the junior Duvalier took office, his father had seen to the thorough decimation of 
any foundations for an institutionalized party system. In its place was a clan of ruthless 
thugs of diverse social backgrounds whose only shared ideology was an indomitable 
allegiance to the Duvalier family and their own pocketbooks.43  
However, the ruthlessly violent measures of Papa Docs regime were 
significantly more restrained under his sons reign. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
political opposition was becoming more organized and Baby Doc began to acquiesce to 
domestic and international pressures for a more liberalized political system. It was during 
this period that there was a resurgence in opposition parties, as approximately a dozen 
such parties were waiting in exile and hoping for the Duvalier regime to either be 
overthrown or institute meaningful democratic reforms.44   
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In February 1979, elections were held for the National Assembly. The official 
government party, Parti de lUnite Nationale, won 57 of the 58 seats. In 1983, allegations 
of electoral fraud and the obstruction of opposition parties tainted the first municipal 
elections in 25 years. In 1984, opposition candidates were not allowed to contest the 
National Assembly elections and another dubious vote return overwhelming benefitted 
the ruling regime. 
Nonetheless, by April of the following year it appeared that Duvalier was 
allowing for a slight liberalization of the political system as he announced his plans for 
constitutional reforms. Perhaps the most important announced reform was the 
legalization and incorporation of political parties into the national political system. 
However, Duvaliers liberal reforms were Constitutional amendments that were 
approved via a fraudulent referendum that among other things provided for severe 
restrictions on the registration of political parties.45 These restrictions were such that 
only if a partys views conformed to the ruling regime would it be allowed to register. 
Consequently, the government allowed only one party, the Duvalierist National 
Progressive Party (PNP), to register.  
Limited reforms were not sufficient to calm the protests of many opposition 
movements, which demanded immediate changes. Due to the continued oppression of 
political parties, these organizations had a small role in this popular mobilization. Instead, 
religious organizations were the primary leaders of the protests. Ever since a massive 
government crackdown in 1980, the Church was the only institution left with any built-
in immunity to State power and became a natural umbrella for all dissent. Churches 
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were the only place that political gatherings could be held with impunity.46 Resultantly, 
religious leaders acquired great political influence as many Haitians looked to such 
individuals for leadership and representation of their interests.  
No other religious leader acquired a stronger following than Father Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide did. Aristide studied abroad and embraced liberation theology as a young man. 
He returned to Haiti and survived several assassination attempts while openly opposing 
the Duvalier regime and subsequent dictatorships, achieving a nationwide following as 
radio addresses transmitted his anti-government rhetoric. He often quoted bible passages 
that called for the poor to defend themselves while simultaneously eyeing the developed 
world as an exploiting force that had unfairly subjugated Haiti. The mostly illiterate slum 
dwellers and peasants of Haiti have always rallied to him as he often led them in protests 
and strikes against the military regimes. Ultimately, Aristide would become the personal 
standard-bearer for a social movement that was not yet institutionalized within the 
context of a political party. 
Although Church-led anti-Duvalier movements had been gaining momentum for 
several years, beginning in November 1985 massive nonviolent uprisings spread 
throughout the country after government forces killed four schoolchildren while 
dispersing a demonstration. In response to these large protests, Duvalier imposed a state 
of siege and declared martial law, closing the university and censoring radio broadcasts.47  
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Such actions had little impact, however. Duvalier eventually lost the support of 
the officer corps and, most critically, the United States. On February 7, 1986, Jean-
Claude Duvalier and his family fled aboard a U.S. Air Force jet en route to exile in 
France. Although the Duvalier era was over, authoritarian oppression would continue to 
spoil democratic initiatives in Haiti. In the ten years following Duvaliers exile, Haiti 
would experience political violence and chaos, including nine presidential elections.48  
4. Political Environment from 1986 1990 
Immediately before the Duvaliers fled Haiti, General Henry Namphy assumed 
national leadership as the head of five-member National Council of Government (CNG). 
Although the new regime provided no support for the electoral process, democratic 
initiatives were pursued by various Haitian elements. Political oppression, although still 
present, would never be as widespread as during the Duvalier regime. Resultantly, 
democratic parties began to organize themselves in increasing numbers. However, the 
overall role of parties from 1986-1990 was limited, since although they were able to 
become better organized, it was instead influential individuals such as Aristide who led 
popular protests that eventually forced the holding of democratic elections. 
One party that developed during this period was the socialist National Congress of 
Haitian Democracy, led by Victor Benoit. Like nearly all of the political reformers of this 
period, he called for the uprooting of the elite. Another such party was the former protest 
movement named The National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD). The FNCD 
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was a political coalition that included workers and peasants but also members from the 
old merchant class who disliked the new manufacturing interests.49   
Soon, it appeared that these and other parties had seemingly gained increased 
political power as their leaders led a popular revolt named operation dechoukaj (Creole 
for operation uprooting). These leaders led a national crusade comprised of strikes and 
mass demonstrations in which they sought to destroy the foundations of Duvalierism.50 
This uprising often became violent, leading to riots and the murder of scores of Tonton 
Macoutes and other Duvalier supporters. However, the ultimate result of this movement 
came about in March 1987, when the Haitian population overwhelmingly approved a new 
Constitution in a referendum held by the government. This new Constitution reflected the 
anti-Duvalierist national sentiment by disallowing any Duvalier-supporting party 
candidate from running for political office.   
During the summer of 1987, Haiti witnessed enormous street demonstrations 
clamoring for the implementation of democratic reforms promised by the new 
Constitution. Opposition leaders, including Aristide, were involved in helping to 
organize demonstrations and protests, many of which resulted in the murder of 
protestors by the government in an effort to maintain its centralized power.51 
Nonetheless, the protest movement was effective, as the government scheduled 
presidential elections for November of that year. Political parties responded 
enthusiastically, as thirty-five candidates registered, and all but twelve Duvalierists were 
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allowed on the ballot. Although two candidates were assassinated, by election day 
seventy-three percent of all eligible voters had registered.  
On November 29, elections were held as scheduled and voter turnout was heavy, 
but the polls were closed within hours of opening as the FADH (Forces Armees dHaiti) 
and Tonton Macoutes murdered thirty-four voters. Two months later, military controlled 
elections were held but were widely boycotted by the population, with only 
approximately five percent of the population voting. Based upon the dubious results of 
this flawed election, the military proclaimed Leslie Manigat the victor, and he soon 
became a puppet of those officers who temporarily held power in Haiti. Following the 
aborted elections and under the Manigat regime, U.S. observers found political parties 
demoralized.52 Instability continued as two separate military coups soon overturned the 
outcome of the Manigat election. Within four months of his placement into power, 
General Namphy seized national leadership, only to be ousted by General Prosper Avril 
on September 17, 1988.53  
Avril installed a largely civilian government, but in truth, the army was still in 
control. Nonetheless, Avril seemed committed to reestablishing democracy, and in 
February 1989, he convened an Electoral Council Forum in which he was willing to 
accept any reasonable proposals the forum might recommend. The meetings had an 
optimistic start as a cross-section of leading opposition figures, representing 28 political 
parties and opposition groups, including several from both the extreme left and right of 
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the Haitian political spectrum attended.54 Two weeks following its initiation, Avril 
accepted the Forums recommendations and issued a decree reestablishing the Electoral 
Council, much to the satisfaction of many opposition parties who were willing to work 
with the government and were seeking new elections.  
However, parties of both the extreme left and right were unwilling to support the 
decree. As Richard Melton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
testified, Both the extreme left and the right remain opposed to reforms. In paradoxical 
fashion, these two political extremes share an objective: to exploit the relative weakness 
of Avrils government and the dismal economic situation in Haiti to forestall reform. 
The worse, the better seems to be their motto.55 Some far left parties, such as KID 
(Democratic Unity Confederation), refused to acknowledge Avrils legitimacy as the 
nations leader, and were unwilling to negotiate with what they saw as an illegal regime. 
Eventually, however, the army acted in the autumn of 1989 before Avril and party 
leaders were able to reach an agreement. A series of military-led killings and brutalities, 
including the torture of three leftist leaders, sparked demonstrations and strikes that led to 
social chaos. However, opposition parties, which remained disorganized and unable to 
rally the populace, were not the force behind these uprisings. Instead, non-political and 
often religious figures were responsible for mobilizing their followers against the 
government. Perhaps no one had a greater impact than Aristide, who established a 
popular movement of pro-democrtaic, grassroots organizations and individual followers. 
He dubbed this movement Lavalas, Creole for flash flood, and through this movement 
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Aristide would become the most well known and influential of all social leaders, although 
he was not associated with any political party.56 
In a desperate attempt to maintain order, Avril ordered widespread repression 
against opposition parties, students, and democratic organizations.57 Avril eventually 
resigned on March 10, 1990 in the face of protests, general strikes, and pressure from 
U.S. Ambassador Alvin Adams. Following Avrils ouster, the moderate General Herard 
Abraham assumed the role of army chief of staff and he immediately accepted the 
formation of a Provisional Government headed by Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal 
Trouillot. Her primary goal was to organize democratic elections as soon as possible; 
within a year, both presidential and general elections would be held in Haiti.58  
B. THE RISE OF FATHER JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE 
The December 1990 presidential election was the only one of the nine since the 
end of the Duvalier regime that all parties acknowledged as free and fair. In a stunning 
upset on December 16, 1990, Aristide received 67.5% of the popular vote, defeating his 
closest competitor, the U.S. Favorite, Marc Bazin, who received a mere 14.2% of all 
ballots.59 A lack of institutionalized parties was the primary reason behind Aristides 
success. While dozens of fragmented and disorganized parties existed in 1990, none had 
a solid base of support within the electorate. Resultantly, populist-supported personalities 
such as Aristide became viable candidates for high offices.  
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During the election campaign, many Haitians were unable to identify with 
particular party mandates and ideologies. In response, the FNCD chose Aristide as their 
presidential candidate due to his personal appeal, charisma, and evangelical message.60 
The organizers of this party knew they needed a candidate who appealed to the masses 
and, if possible, already had a nation-wide following. Without such personal appeal, a 
candidate campaigning primarily on his partys platform would have little chance.  
 
Ultimately, Aristide would benefit from the lack of an institutionalized party 
system and win the December election by a landslide. The following month, however, the 
outcome of the election was placed in jeopardy as a coup attempt materialized. Roger 
Lafontant, a former Interior Minister during the Duvalier regime and head of the Tonton 
Macoutes, led a coup even before Aristide could be sworn into office. However, after 
Aristide supporters rioted in the streets and stormed the Presidential Palace, forces loyal 
to the government arrested Lafontant and the coup attempt was struck down. Such an 
occurrence foreshadowed how Aristide would have to depend upon the easily excitable 
members of his political congregation in order to remain in office. The direct link that he 
had made with his followers would provide the only support he would be able to rely 
upon after he was sworn in as president. 
C.  THE 1991 ARISTIDE ADMINISTRATION 
Aristides presidency granted the Haitian people the greatest political freedom 
they had known since before the Duvalier regime. This reprise from oppression would be 
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short-lived, however, since seven months after Aristides inauguration, a military coup 
overthrew the president, establishing General Raoul Cedras as the leader of Haiti. Via the 
presidential election, Aristides Lavalas movement had captured a solid majority of the 
nations population through the support of the poor, in itself a clear victory for 
democratic ideals. Why then did such a promising government and democratic movement 
with the support of two-thirds of the voting population end so quickly? 
1. Impact of Weak Party Institutionalization on Aristide Government 
While there are many factors that contributed to the eventual ouster of Aristide, a 
primary reason is that in 1990 and 1991, no institutionalized party system existed 
throughout the nations body politic. In particular, the lack of an institutionalized party 
system undermined Aristides relationship with his potential supporters in the legislature 
at the same time that he chose to rely upon his support base in society. Due partially to 
this latter factor, Aristide in turn found it difficult to have an effective working 
relationship with his opposition.  
a.  Support Base in Legislature 
As shown in the previous chapter, political parties can promote strong 
relations between the legislative and executive branches of government. However, this 
benefit cannot be attained if the executive leader sharply deviates from his party platform. 
Such was the situation between Aristide and the FNCD, as Aristide, even before he was 
elected, never intended to pursue or defend his partys platform. In reality, Aristide was 
never a true representative of his party; he only used the FNCD as a party name upon 
which to register into the election. In fact, the partys leadership secured Aristides 
cooperation by promising that if he won the election, they would work in conjunction 
with Lavalas in achieving Aristides reform objectives. 
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Resultantly, after his inauguration Aristide did not incorporate the ideas or 
opinions of his fellow party members in the legislature as he attempted to make policy 
and enact initiatives in a near-authoritarian manner. As Aristide become more adamant 
and inflexible in pursuing his policy initiatives, he soon alienated many within and 
outside of Haiti, causing tensions to mount throughout the entire Haitian political system. 
Why did Aristide discount the importance of the legislature? Clearly, he 
could not afford to squander any support in this branch, since the FNCD did not have a 
majority in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. Most likely, it was Aristides 
overwhelming percentage of votes in the presidential election compared to the 36% of 
legislative seats held by the FNCD.61 He must have realized that since his party did not 
have a majority in both houses, in order to pass initiatives into law he would have to 
compromise with his opposition.62 However, Aristide felt that with so many Haitians 
personally supporting him, he would not be serving their interests if he compromised on 
his campaign promises. Ultimately, frustrated by his inability to enact his reforms due to 
a lack of legislative support, one of Aristides costliest errors was, 
Marginalizing, then antagonizing, and eventually attacking, his own 
political party and its followers within the legislature. It was this behavior 
that best reveals not only Aristides modus operandi but indeed how soon 
and completely he had picked up the very conventional Haitian emphasis 
on the presidency as the only significant office.63  
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However, the Haitian legislature was no longer willing to accept this 
tradition. The FNCD representatives in this branch were insulted when Aristide did not 
involve or even informally consult with them as he made policy and pursued his own 
personal agenda. Since he was unwilling to commit to the party mandate of the FNCD, or 
even compromise his personal convictions, his fellow party members in the legislature in 
turn denounced their partys commitment to him and did not support him.  
b.  Support Base in Society 
Without a party to support him, Aristides only viable source of political 
support was the socially-based Lavalas movement. However, Aristide soon learned that 
this organization, which had no legislative representatives, was no substitute for a 
supporting political party. With Lavalas, he could not rely upon party support in the 
legislature, no matter how many millions of Haitians agreed with his particular agenda or 
provided him with popular support. 
Additionally, many Haitians saw Aristide as a messianic figure that 
transcended politics, one that could personally assist and lead the impoverished. This 
religious aspect of Aristides persona, the force which propelled him into the Presidential 
Palace, also defined and ultimately restricted his ability to govern as it became as much 
of a curse as a blessing.64 
In order to maintain the image upon which he depended, Aristide 
continued to present himself as a religious figure. His fiery rhetoric served him well both 
as a populist priest and as a candidate. As president, in an effort to maintain his 
popularity with his supporters, he continued to employ verbose and inflammatory 
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proclamations. These actions undermined his appeal among the more educated and less 
impressionable elements of Haitian society. On September 27, 1991, Aristide offered a 
particularly graphic speech in which he alluded to the benefit of necklacing, or the 
placement of burning tires, around the necks of his political opponents.65 Whether this 
proclamation was a direct cause or not, the coup that would end his presidency occurred a 
mere three days after this statement was made. 
Aristide also aimed his economic policies at maintaining his popularity 
with his followers with little regard as to how these policies would affect the bourgeoise 
and the upper classes. Aristide attempted to mitigate and correct Haitis many economic 
problems by personally seeking support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. He attempted to initiate new public works projects, make the wealthy 
pay an increased percentage of taxes, impose levies on factory operators, support the 
growth of trade unions, and raise the minimum wage from $3 to $5 a day. These and 
other initiatives greatly angered Haitian elites to the point that they labeled Aristide a 
Bolshevik and the devil.66  
In an attempt to reallocate funds rapidly to the poor and maintain their 
support, Aristide requested in an intemperate and threatening manner that the monied 
classes contribute millions of dollars to the state. Not only was such coercion illegal, 
but he also only gave these individuals four days to comply. Such actions reminded some 
of the Duvaliers notorious voluntary contributions campaigns.67 
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c.  Relationship with Opposition 
Due to the minority position of the FNCD in parliament and Aristides 
uncompromising initiatives, he had to contend with an opposition-controlled legislature. 
The lack of a majority in both chambers would soon be a major obstacle for Aristide, as 
he would have to negotiate with opposition parties over the choice of a prime minister 
and other policy matters.68 Francois Benoit, the vice president of the National Alliance, 
an alliance of center-right and socialist politicians, stated that if Aristide expected to 
govern effectively, an intense period of coalition building between the FNCD and its 
opponents would be required.69  
However, no such coalitions were established for two reasons. First, 
Aristide was unwilling to compromise. Second, even if Aristide had tried to reach a 
working agreement with right-wing opposition parties, such a feat would have been 
extremely difficult. This was the case since there was no single party with which to 
compromise; instead, there were many small, fragmented parties. Each organization 
represented a very small section of society, and it would have been nearly impossible to 
reach a consensus on major issues with so many positions weighing into the balance. 
Nonetheless, the legislative representatives of the elite, although still 
divided into many small, disparate parties, were able to organize sufficiently against 
Aristide; almost all of the opposition parties shared a common bond in rejecting 
Aristides initiatives. Resultantly, nearly all of Aristides initiatives were blocked by 
parliament, which still consisted largely of representatives of traditional political 
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organizations and not Lavalas activists.70 After the September coup, Aristide proclaimed 
that one of his most critical mistakes was that he showed too little respect for the 
independence of the parliament.71  
2. The Collapse of Democracy and the Cedras Regime 
In a democracy, every sector of society must feel they are able to influence 
government through established democratic means. When Aristide lashed out at nearly 
every political party, including the FNCD, such actions made the effective operation of a 
party system impossible, which in turn made democratic consolidation elusive. 
Although compromises would not have given Aristide the absolute victories he 
had wanted, he should have realized that in a democracy, the executive can legitimately 
govern strictly by decree only under the most dire emergencies and then only 
temporarily. While the various party representatives in a democracys legislative branch 
may not always possess commensurate powers as the executive, ambitious executive 
leaders must not discount their interests and often-implacable political power.  
If an institutionalized party system had existed, Aristides party or a coalition of 
allied parties might have had a majority in Congress. Alternatively, if no majority existed, 
Aristide might have achieved compromises with his opponents, thus allowing initiatives 
to become beneficial laws. Such a development might have assuaged the fears of the 
elite, including the military, and the eventual coup might have been avoided.  
Ultimately, however, it became apparent that those who continued to subscribe to 
the violent historical nature of Haitian politics did not yet acknowledge that democracy 
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was the only legitimate path to governmental power. No longer did all actors see this 
system of government as the only game in town. Three days after the infamous 
necklacing speech, Aristide barely escaped Haiti alive after a military coup removed 
him from the Presidential Palace on September 30. The newly born, yet non-
institutionalized, Haitian democracy had lasted only nine months. 
In October 1991, the army appointed Joseph Nerette as interim President and Jean 
Jacques Honorat as Prime Minister, although the true control of the government remained 
with Cedras and the military. Despite international condemnation, all immediate efforts 
to reinstate Aristide were unsuccessful. Instead, Nerettes term of office was extended 
indefinitely, and in June 1992, Marc Bazin, who was legitimately defeated by Aristide in 
the 1990 presidential election, was made Prime Minister. 
The Cedras regime threw Haiti back into political repression and violence akin to 
the days of Papa Doc Duvalier. It would take three years, two U.S. administrations, 
crushing economic sanctions, countless diplomatic efforts, and an international military 
coalition of tens of thousands of foreign troops to restore democracy in the autumn of 
1994. As had been the case in 1990-1991, Haiti again faced the daunting task of 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57
IV. HAITIAN PARTY SYSTEM: FROM 1994 INTERVENTION TO 
PRESENT 
The U.S.-led intervention was widely considered a success as Operation Uphold 
Democracy rekindled optimism in Haitis future. This military intervention removed 
Cedras from power and reinstated Aristide to his rightful position. The military, which 
had been responsible for persecuting political opposition and thus undermining party 
institutionalization, was dissolved. It seemed possible that the violent and chaotic 
political environment that had plagued Haiti might finally be ending. Unfortunately, a 
lack of party institutionalization continued to exist in Haiti following the UN 
intervention. 
This chapter examines why in the years following the reinstatement of Aristide, 
the Haitian party system has made little progress towards achieving institutionalization. 
The primary factor contributing to this dilemma has been the actions of elites, who have 
attempted to maintain (or achieve) political power through non-institutionalized means. 
Many Haitian elites have either been unable, or unwilling, to compromise with each other 
over central issues. Similar to their predecessors, many political actors have been wary of 
surrendering to parties the personal political influence that they have been able to 
accumulate. 
In particular, President Aristides actions and policies have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of the party system. Aristides continued lack of cooperation with 
other political leaders and his cultivation and reliance upon his own personal appeal have 
resulted in political dominance even when out of office. For these reasons and others that 
the following chapter will examine, Haiti has not been able to attain any of the four 
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conditions of an institutionalized party system. This chapter evaluates the state of party 
institutionalization in the immediate aftermath of the intervention and also during the 
1995 legislative and presidential elections, the 1996-2001 Preval administration, and the 
latest Aristide presidency. 
A. THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF INTERVENTION 
Following the intervention, there was an increased independence of political 
parties from the ambitions of elite actors, along with several major parties development 
of more stable roots in society. These two developments were not independent of each 
other, but were instead intertwined. As parties gained more independence from individual 
ambitions, their roots in society stabilized as they were able to concentrate on pursuing 
the interests of their constituents. Concurrently, as parties stabilized and further 
entrenched themselves in society via more defined ideological positions, it became more 
difficult for individual elites to manipulate these parties for their own selfish reasons. 
Likewise, those parties that were unable to establish permanent roots were forced to 
either disband or change their platforms in order to reflect the interests of society. 
For example, following the re-establishment of democracy, the parties in 
opposition to Aristide lost a great deal of public support due to their previous affiliation 
with Cedras, whose regime many Haitians had come to despise. Many Haitians who had 
been prosecuted, or saw friends and family killed, during the Cedras regime believed that 
the act of meeting with and giving legitimacy to parties that supported the military is 
tantamount to betrayal.72  
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A great deal of animosity toward their political rivals remained among Aristide 
supporters even after the exile of Cedrass junta. One Haitian government official 
compared the political situation to modern European history by stating, People who 
supported the coup dont have a chance of getting elected, period. That is a fact. For 
us, those who supported the coup are like the Nazis. We see them not as enemies of 
Aristide, but as enemies of the democratic process.73 Those parties that had supported 
the Cedras regime enjoyed almost no popular support, and consequently, they had to 
either adapt to societys interest (an end to military rule) or disband. This fact led to an 
increase in party institutionalization, since those parties that would support candidates 
who were willing to achieve office through non-democratic means were no longer 
considered viable contenders within the party system. 
Due partially to this lack of support for opposition parties, upon Aristides return 
the primary struggle for Haitian political power shifted to within Lavalas as varying 
factions began to dissolve into separate parties. The debate over whether Aristide should 
remain president for three more years as compensation for his exile was the driving 
argument that splintered the Lavalas movement. 
According to the 1987 Constitution, no Haitian is eligible to run for reelection 
immediately after serving as president, which disqualified Aristide from the 1995 
presidential election. Having a president whom was less of a populist than Aristide 
seemed eminent; resultantly this election posed an excellent opportunity for further 
institutionalization of the party system. However, although Aristide left the presidency, 
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he was able to maintain nearly all of his previous political influence after leaving office, 
thus significantly hampering further party system institutionalization. 
During the final months of his term, Aristides staggering popularity raised the 
question among many Haitians that since he had been in exile for three years, perhaps his 
presidency should be extended by an equal amount of time. Considering his resilient 
personal attractiveness, such an option seemed very likely on the streets of Haiti. As a 
RAND analyst stated in early 1995, There is no candidate with the wide base of popular 
appeal and organization that the President enjoys with his Lavalas party. Furthermore, 
Some have argued that the country needs Aristide, both because he is a figure of unity, 
and because at this critical time he represents the countrys best hope for needed 
continuity and stability.74 Aristide, placing his personal ambitions above the Haitian 
Constitution, encouraged his supporters that wanted a three-year extension through 
statements such as, I hear you. If you want three more years, you wont be 
disappointed.75 
Despite the many possible scenarios, ultimately Aristide, under significant U.S. 
pressure, on November 30 announced that he would not be a candidate in the presidential 
election. Instead, Aristide personally selected his close friend and Prime Minister of the 
1991 administration, Rene Preval, as the Lavalas Platform candidate. Despite this action, 
Aristide waited until only two days before the December 17 election to endorse publicly 
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his selected protégé by proclaiming, I will cast my ballot for Rene Preval.76 Aristide 
waited as long as he did to support Preval because his friend had earlier refused to 
support the idea of seeing Aristide remain in power for an additional three years. 
Nonetheless, through Aristides decision not to pursue extended rule, the stage was set 
for Haitis first transition of power from one democratically elected leader to another. 
 Although the splintering of Aristide supporters added more parties to an already 
confusing political landscape, this thesis argues that this occurrence was beneficial to the 
Haitian party system. The abandonment of the Lavalas movement by many previously 
loyal factions, such as the FNCD, Aristides former party, demonstrated that Aristide was 
losing his messianic appeal with some of his supporters. Many such former followers 
were no longer satisfied with Aristides rhetoric, and instead began to believe in other 
platforms that would serve their constituencys needs more effectively. As a result, 
political leaders began to stress ideologies and political platforms as the rightful 
foundation of parties, instead of blind devotion to an influential and charismatic 
individual.  
These formerly-Lavalas opposition parties quickly arose to the forefront of the 
political arena as they made their opposition to Aristides extended presidency a central 
party tenet. They were able to support this position successfully since a division between 
supporters and opponents of Aristide was a very significant issue already present among 
many Haitians. Furthermore, it provided the potential to impose order on an otherwise 
chaotic party system by dividing it into two coalitions. Those political parties that 
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addressed the issue and adopted a policy either for or against Aristide served Haitis party 
system and its citizens well by addressing an important national issue that had already 
produced a significant social cleavage. 
Nonetheless, some Aristide supporters remained faithful to their leader. These 
followers retained the Lavalas title and instituted the Lavalas Political Platform (PPL), a 
coalition of three parties with the largest being the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL). 
Since this coalition, and especially the OPL, constituted the bulk of the former Lavalas 
movement and remained personally loyal to Aristide, he granted the PPL his 
endorsement. However, the general coordinator of the OPL, Gerard Pierre-Charles, and 
many other OPL leaders did not believe that Aristide should stay in power, and instead 
sought a December 1995 presidential election as per the 1987 Constitution. These 
individuals believed that, Lavalas belongs to no oneIt is a child of the people. Even if 
a candidate, a leader in a difficult moment claims paternity, it is the people who have 
borne Lavalas in their hearts since time immemorial.77  
This rhetoric and the abandonment by many former followers could not however 
erase the fact that Aristide remained the patriarch for many within Haiti, and still 
possessed greater electoral appeal than any other individual or party. Inevitably, tensions 
mounted over this and other issues between Aristide and Pierre-Charles, driving Aristide 
to challenge Pierre-Charles and others in his party for the leadership of the remnants of 
the former Lavalas movement.  
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Ultimately, the significance of the three more years argument was a division in 
the Haitian government between those either for or against Aristide. The dispute between 
the two sides would be temporarily resolved when Aristide stepped down from the 
presidency on the originally scheduled date, but would soon thereafter greatly intensify 
and restructure the Haitian political party system. 
B. 1995 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
Although improvements were made toward institutionalizing the party system 
following Aristides return, legislative elections the following summer would test the 
stability of the party systems rules. Lamentably, political parties, many of which were 
still only the personal vehicles of their leaders, and the government could not reach a 
consensus over how to administer these contests. In particular, the governments 
Provisional Elections Council (CEP), the body tasked with ensuring free and fair 
elections, failed to apply electoral law objectively as the votes were counted and winners 
declared. Resultantly, these flawed elections cast doubt over the electoral and party 
systems, as many political actors in both Haiti and abroad questioned the legitimacy of 
the election results and the government that administered them. 
Legislative elections were scheduled for June 25 and marked the first such 
contests ever held under a democratic Haitian government. Whether or not the 
international community would see these elections as legitimate would depend upon if 
the various Haitian political elites, including the President, respected the rule of law and 
the electoral process. Fortunately, it appeared that during his exile Aristide had realized 
the importance of cooperating with other political parties as well as with the members of 
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his own party. Throughout late 1994, he met with leaders of all political parties in order 
to discuss important topics, such as his economic initiatives.  
Perhaps the one topic, however, that received the most attention was how to best 
establish and select the nine members for a new Provisional Elections Council (CEP), a 
central body that would oversee the upcoming legislative and municipal elections. Some 
of Aristides followers regarded such commendable actions with confusion or concern. 
Many within the disintegrating Lavalas movement were worried that their leader was 
being too receptive to their perceived political enemies. Such concerns were unwarranted, 
however, since when the members comprising the new CEP were announced at the end 
of the year, a majority of the selectees were Lavalas Platform supporters. Without 
surprise, the CEP became very ineffective at addressing the complaints of non-Lavalas 
parties as the legislative elections loomed on the horizon.  
Eventually, in April 1995 a majority of parties from across the political spectrum 
signed a resolution demanding changes to the structure of the CEP while offering a list of 
possible candidates for incorporation into the council. This occurrence marked the first 
time in which dozens of small, little-known political parties collectively organized in an 
effort to match the influence of Aristide and his newly created Lavalas Platform. One of 
the leaders of this effort and the head of a socialist party, Serge Giles, stated, We are not 
prepared to participate in elections, such as they are being prepared. Addressing a 
central question of the Haitian electoral system, he asked, Does the electoral council 
really think it can hold elections without political parties?78  
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However, the CEP was unwilling to modify its membership and denied that it 
favored any particular political party, candidate, or platform. The CEP President Anselme 
Remy told reporters, We will not abdicate our constitutional mission to organize free, 
honest, and democratic elections. Remy continued, The resolution wants to substitute 
the political parties for the electoral council. There is no proof that the Lavalas Political 
Organization controls the electoral apparatus.79  
The CEPs apparent ambivalence towards ensuring a fair electoral environment 
enraged many, leading three opposition parties to boycott the polls. Most of the 
remaining twenty-seven registered parties did not trust the CEP, and although they would 
participate, they doubted the fairness with which the CEP would administer the elections. 
The opposition parties felt that the Aristide-dominated bureaucracy and CEP harbored 
animosities from the past and had a powerful motivation to tamper with election results. 
As an unofficial U.S. observer noted before the election, At the current time, most of the 
parties do not believe that the electoral playing field is fair.80 
As the elections approached, it was becoming apparent that opposition to Aristide 
was solidifying and becoming increasingly organized. Nonetheless, over sixty parties 
(although only approximately half would actually field a candidate on the ballot) for the 
various political races took part in the 1995 nation-wide elections. Ultimately, over 
12,000 candidates representing thirty parties competed for 110 national legislation seats 
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and more than 2,000 municipal offices. This lack of party institutionalization would make 
the carrying out of elections a daunting task. 
Also, repeated delays that had been necessary in order to register voters and 
approve candidates had compressed candidates campaigns to only a few days before the 
decided upon day of the election. The result was that very few Haitians were familiar 
with the issues, parties, or candidates, and this greatly handicapped the possibility of free 
and fair elections. Another implication of this massive, simultaneous undertaking was 
that it threatened to overtax an already weak Haitian electoral administration. 
The alleged actions of some political parties added further illegitimacy to the 
party system. The Haitian media accused several parties of supporting and participating 
in acts of violence, such as intimidating voters and the torching of polling tables, during 
the election. These and all of the other difficulties overwhelmed the Haitian electoral 
apparatus on June 25, as Chaos and assassination threats kept polls closed across the 
nation Sunday, preventing hundreds of thousands of Haitians from voting in their first 
free election in five years.81 After the polls closed, Dr. Robert Pastor, the lead observer 
for the U.S.-based Carter Center, stated,  
The elections were nothing less than an administrative disaster, with an 
insecure vote count. Virtually all the political parties except the 
Plateforme Politique Lavalas (PPL), which was associated with the 
government, condemned the election and called for its annulment even 
before the results were announced.82  
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Aristide admitted only that there were technical irregularities in the elections, in 
which Lavalas Platform was reported to have won a combined 45 percent of the vote in 
the first round. The next most successful party was the FNCD, which took a mere 13 
percent of the vote during the first round of balloting. Another Lavalas splinter party and 
Haitis third largest, KONAKOM, received approximately eight percent in the first 
round. In order to address the allegations that these results were due to a pro-Lavalas bias 
within the Electoral Council, Aristide initiated a dialogue with all political sectors.  
Between the first and the following rounds of the election, the U.S. State 
Department, the OAS, and the UN made repeated efforts to bring about a resolution to 
the differences between the government, the primary opposition leaders, and international 
observers. Such negotiations initially resulted in open dialogue and promising 
compromises, as the Haitian authorities expressed willingness to adopt many third party 
proposals in order to negotiate a settlement. Most impressively, the government agreed to 
the demand that the president of the CEP be replaced. However, the U.S. Special Haiti 
Coordinator, Ambassador James Dobbins, reported that ultimately suspicions of both the 
authorities and the opposition leaders proved unsurmountable [sic]. The Ambassador 
testified before Congress, 
Opposition leaders were unwilling to work with the Haitian Electoral 
Council, even after their key initial demand for the replacement of the 
president of that council had been met. The Haitian authorities, for their 
part, harbored concerns that the opposition, aware that it was likely to lose 
any election in the near future, would take advantage of any role they 
might be granted in selecting new members of the Electoral Council in 
order to block completion of the election, and postpone indefinitely the 
seating of a new parliament.83 
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In the end, even with foreign mediation, it proved impossible to agree on 
modalities for altering the membership of the Electoral Council which were broadly 
acceptable, and legal under Haitian law.84  
After the first round of balloting Lavalas faced even less opposition. This was 
because the FNCD and KONAKOM, along with most other parties, boycotted the 
subsequent rounds, hurling charges that the elections were rigged and grossly 
mismanaged.85 The party system had completely broken down after the first round, and 
this dilemma instantaneously impacted the perceived legitimacy of the follow-on 
elections throughout Haiti. In the final round of voting, less than five percent of the 
registered voters even bothered to show up at the polls.  
The lack of an institutionalized party system had brought Haitian democratic 
consolidation to a virtual standstill. When the final contests were ended in early October 
and the votes were tallied, Lavalas Platform won 17 of 27 seats in the Senate and 67 of 
83 seats in the House of Deputies. Furthermore, many elected independents were Lavalas 
allies. Throughout the Haitian countryside, the PPL carried the day further by securing 70 
percent of 133 mayoral races, and most of the nations township councils were also won 
by PPL candidates and their allies. With such a small percentage of voters participating, 
few believed that these elections reflected the true will of the Haitian people. 
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C. TRANSITION OF POWER TO PREVAL 
During the period between the legislative elections and the presidential contest in 
December 1995, it became apparent that Haiti was still lacking all four of the conditions 
inherent in an institutionalized party system. There was little agreement on or respect for 
the rules of competition as evidenced by constant electoral disputes. In addition, over a 
dozen parties that the electorate did not identify with fragmented the opposition as 
Haitian democracy approached a one-party system dominated by Lavalas.  
Furthermore, even after Prevals election, however, Aristide continued to cast his 
shadow over Haitian politics. Many Haitians and international observers accurately 
perceived that Prevals popular appeal derived not from his own personality or efforts, 
but from his perceived closeness to Mr. Aristide.86 Many worried that although Aristide 
was no longer in office, he would continue to wield power through his successor. As a 
leading Haitian businessman stated, The question is whether Preval is going to have 
room to move, whether Aristide will constantly be breathing down his neck. The best 
thing that could happen to Preval would be for Aristide to do as Jimmy Carter has done 
and go off and mediate an international crisis, say like Rwanda.87  
Such fears were justified, as Aristide maintained as much political power as he 
could by continuing to pursue his own personal agenda. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a key 
factor inhibiting party institutionalization is the actions of elites who attempt to maintain 
power. Aristides decision to not support Preval until two days before the election and 
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similar actions suggested Aristide was attempting to retain as much power for as long as 
possible, while preventing Preval from developing on his own.  
Although the presidential election promised to be a more straightforward affair 
than the earlier legislative contests, the continuing unstable nature of interparty relations, 
dominated by a single party, threatened to affect negatively the democratic process. For 
example, fourteen candidates were listed on the ballots for the electorate to choose from, 
and only Preval was easily recognized throughout the countryside. Furthermore, many 
political parties, at this point labeled microparties because of their minute social base, 
had decided to boycott the election.88  
Had the thirteen participating opposition parties and the many that were 
boycotting consolidated their efforts into a single, viable party or coalition and mutually 
supported a sole candidate, Preval might have faced true competition. However, broad 
political differences and open conflict remained among these parties; while some were 
left-wing, former Lavalas Movement organizations, several other parties were led by 
candidates who had supported the September 1991 coup. In any case, it was obvious that 
Preval had the upper hand due to the support of Aristide and the Lavalas Platform, as 
well as the support of the CEP, which was still comprised primarily of Aristide 
sympathizers. 
Ultimately, Preval easily won the election with an astounding 87.9 percent of the 
vote. On Christmas Eve he was declared president-elect, winning hands-down an 
election that most voters boycotted, since only 27.94 percent of the electorate voted. 
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Furthermore, twenty-one political parties officially abstained from the election, alleging 
that the electoral council was biased in favor of Aristides three party bloc.89  
However, no evidence existed to support this claim. In fact, many domestic and 
international observers, including some former members of the Cedras government, 
believed that this contest had been one of the most fair and transparent elections in 
Haitian history despite the low voter turnout. Marc Bazin, who finished a distant second 
behind Aristide in the 1990 election and had his reputation tarnished by serving as the de 
facto prime minister during the ensuing military regime, hailed the election as a huge 
step forward for democracy.90 Brian Atwood, the leader of the U.S. observer delegation 
and director of USAID, concurred, calling the election a crucial milestone in Haitis 
progress toward an enduring democratic order. Although Atwood was disappointed with 
the low voter turnout, he did not believe that it undermined the results since it was not 
caused by fear of persecution or disenfranchisement. He stated, We saw absolutely none 
of that here. The turnout does not in any way harm or destroy the legitimacy of this 
process.91  
Why did many opposition leaders make allegations about a pro-Preval bias when 
all international observers said this was not the case? Significant portions of the 
opposition choose to delegitimize the elections when they realized that they were not 
going to do well. There is no place in an institutionalized party system for the practice of 
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making baseless allegations that undermine the legitimacy of the systems with the sole 
intent of making up for an electoral defeat.  
Accounting for the low turnout, however, although voters were not oppressed, a 
number of other factors were present that attributed to a disappointing level of 
participation. The first reason was an apparent lack of tangible economic benefits since 
the reestablishment of democracy had disillusioned many voters; they had seen little 
improvement in their lives since the return of democracy and had given up on its 
promises. Second, electoral fatigue from the previous rounds of elections discouraged 
voters. As Cesar Gaviria, the Secretary-General of the OAS, noted, Having five votes in 
six months is too much.92 The third, and arguably most critical, factor for the low voter 
turnout was the absence of Aristide from the ballot. As one journalist in Haiti observed a 
week after Prevals victory, Many of those who stayed away said they did so because 
Mr. Aristide was not on the ballot. That only served to reinforce the most important point 
about Haitian politics: in or out of office, Mr. Aristide remains the only leader with the 
power to inspire his countrymen to action.93 
Ultimately, the ability of a single individual to affect voter participation to such an 
extent greatly hindered the effectiveness of the party system. The fact that many Haitians 
still related more to Aristides persona than party platforms demonstrated that parties still 
did not have stable roots in society. This factor would make it very difficult for the Preval 
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and political parties to pursue their platforms independent of Aristides ambitions during 
the next administration. 
D. PREVAL ADMINISTRATION 
The party system completely collapsed during the Preval administration. The 
primary reason was the continuing ambition of Aristide, who undermined the PPL by 
establishing his own personally led party, Lavalas Family. This action threw the entire 
party system into turmoil, as the political landscape entered a continuous state of flux 
with party platforms incessantly shifting. The electorate did not identify with the parties 
and, as a result, voter turnout in the 1997 elections was abysmal. Further undermining 
system institutionalization, the CEP again proved unable to create a stable environment 
for interparty competition. In addition, some of the blame for this dilemma must go to the 
opposition and its boycotts, which partially delegitimized elections and stalled the 
development of the party systems competitive rules and nature. Ultimately, it would take 
almost two years and Prevals suspension of parliament to overcome these issues, and by 
then Preval faced an almost non-existent party system. 
However, Preval would find the greatest challenge to his presidency would not 
come from opposition parties, but instead from within his own governing coalition. In his 
first year as president, Preval encountered resistance to his administration from within the 
PPL, and in particular the OPL, as a majority of the members still felt stronger allegiance 
to Aristide than the new president. Almost immediately, Preval lost nearly all support 
from the party he had been elected to represent, making executive-legislative relations 
almost nonexistent. In Prevals first month as president, the OPL fought against him over 
who should be named Prime Minister. The continual presence of Aristide, who always 
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had to be included as a third negotiator, further hampered negotiations and diluted 
Prevals authority.94  
Despite a near-total lack of cooperation between Prevals administration and the 
legislature, the President pursued his pragmatic reforms. However, as one journalist 
prophetically noted in early 1996, Haitian parties do not exist beyond their high-profile 
leadership and the most influential political voice is still that of ex-President Aristide.95 
Furthermore, although Aristide had not run for President in 1995, he soon demonstrated 
that he was not willing to support anyone else, even his selected successor.  
After the election, Aristide remained as the figurehead for the Lavalas Platform, 
and it was apparent that many who voted for Preval had done so due to their undying 
allegiance to Aristide. Aristide used his still remaining popular appeal to undermine the 
legitimacy of Preval by influencing his millions of still faithful followers. However, even 
if Preval had somehow separated himself and his initiatives from Aristide, his already 
weak mandate stemming directly from a small minority of the population would have 
been in serious jeopardy.96 As one foreign diplomat in Haiti stated immediately before 
the election, This remains a very poor and troubled country with an extremely weak 
government structure. The new President is going to have to confront all of the same 
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problems that faced Aristide, but without the very important advantage of being Aristide 
and having the authority and prestige he enjoys.97  
In November 1996, taking advantage of Prevals weakness and the diverging 
interests within the PPL, Aristide officially established a new political party, Lavalas 
Family. Preval became a president without a party as many PPL members followed 
Aristide, and those remaining did not trust nor want to work with Preval due to his former 
association with Aristide. By the creation of Lavalas Family and the resultant gutting of 
the PPL, the level of party institutionalization in Haiti was brought to near nothingness as 
the stabilizing roots of Aristides former party were totally uprooted. If a single 
individual could influence a majority of the leading party to come over to his personal 
vehicle, it demonstrated that personal appeal still possessed more influence in Haiti than 
any independent political organization. 
In response to Aristides formation of Lavalas Family, the OPLs leader, Gerard 
Pierre-Charles, characterized Aristide as having a paternalist, charismatic, populist 
vision of power. His political sense is directly related to long-standing caudillo 
traditions.98 Through Aristides forming of his own party and the rebuffing of Prevals 
initiatives, the former priest indeed refurbished his populist credentials.  
Senator Jean-Robert Martinez summarized Aristides action by stating, The 
creation of an Aristide party consummates the rupture of Aristide and Preval 
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supporters.99 The forming of a new party from within Lavalas Platform, the largest and 
most influential political party, threw the party system into chaos. Many representatives 
of former Lavalas movement parties were torn between supporting their current party or 
following the most powerful figure in the nation.  
On April 6, 1997, the first series of scheduled legislative elections commenced for 
nine of the twenty-seven Senate seats and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies, in 
addition to local council races. These elections were conducted against a backdrop of 
political turbulence largely traced to divisions within the Lavalas movement and a 
perception of governmental and legislative paralysis.100 The party system was not 
represented well, as many opposition parties boycotted these elections. Even with the 
boycott, there were approximately 70 candidates vying for nine available Senate seats. 
Even worse, the political turmoil of the preceding months had prevented parties from 
making advances with the electorate as less than 5% of the electorate voted.  
Furthermore, the CEP decided not to count the many cast ballots that had been 
left blank by voters as required by law. The importance of this step was that under 
Haitian law, if a candidate secures a majority of all votes, including blank votes, he wins 
the election outright after the first round. However, if a majority is not attained, another 
round between the most successful candidates is required. Therefore, opposition parties 
alleged that the CEPs procedural discrepancy determined the outcome of the two Senate 
races won by Lavalas Family candidates. For the remaining seven seats, no candidate 
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secured a majority, resulting in the necessity for a run-off round. However, a second vote 
was soon postponed indefinitely, and these seven vacant seats, along with the two 
disputed positions won by Lavalas Family, would become the most contested Haitian 
political issue during the remainder of Prevals administration. 
Ever since its creation in late 1994, Aristide opposition parties had alleged that the 
CEP had unfairly favored Aristides coalition, and in particular the OPL, the largest of 
the three parties within the PPL. After Aristides self-removal from these parties and the 
founding of Lavalas Family in late 1996, the OPL then alleged that members of the CEP 
had manipulated the election results in favor of Lavalas Family. The OPL, who had seen 
so many of its candidates assisted into office through dubious CEP decisions, called for 
the annulment of these latest election results and a new contest.  
Predictably, Lavalas Family insisted the contest results were fair and the results 
should stand. However, OAS observers supported the OPLs claims of electoral 
irregularities and, following international pressure, the CEP postponed the second round 
of elections until mid-June. The OPL was not satisfied with these actions, and announced 
that it would boycott the June contests, which soon became a moot point since the CEP 
eventually announced the indefinite postponement of the second round. 
Was the CEP unfairly supporting Aristides new party, or was the OPL simply 
trying to manipulate unfavorable election results? It is difficult to tell, but if the first 
scenario is accurate, then the CEP, which had been formed during Aristides 
administration, remained loyal to Aristide by favoring his new party. In this case, this did 
not bode well for the party system, since it is clear that a supposedly neutral council was 
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misusing its position, in turn undermining the credibility of the electoral process. If the 
second scenario is true, and the CEP did act justly, this also did not bode well for the 
party system, since a major party no longer had faith in the political process. Either way, 
it was clear that the parties had not yet agreed upon the rules and means for conducting 
elections, halting any progress towards party institutionalization.  
Fighting between parties over the actions of the CEP and other issues of electoral 
rules continued into 1998. Hardly any new laws were passed as the collapse of the party 
system paralyzed the entire government. Some foreign observers summarized the 
political scene in one word: chaos.101 Nonetheless, in August 1998 the OPL 
optimistically offered a compromise solution to the ongoing impasse. This party 
forwarded a new initiative where the electoral conflict be handled by the new 
Provisional Electoral Council CEP in charge of organizing the next elections. The OPL 
said it was prepared to abide by any CEP decision regarding the still-disputed election. 
Senator Paul Denis stated, If the new CEP thinks that the results of the 6th April 
elections are valid we will abide by it, if the CEP decides otherwise, we will accept it.  
However, Lavalas Family responded they would never accept this logic, which 
could constitute a bad precedent.102 Instead, Lavalas Family continued to embrace the 
decision of the ruling CEP at the time of the election. This party was unwilling to have a 
new CEP possibly overturn the two Lavalas Family representatives victories, even 
though the previous CEP did not follow the law by not counting blank votes.  
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The crisis culminated in Prevals shutting down of the Parliament in January 1999 
in a bid to end the power struggle between the differing parties. While this suspension of 
the legislature could have worked against the president, progress towards establishing a 
functioning party system was soon attained as President Preval hosted a series of 
negotiations among all political leaders. Equally important, Lavalas Family did not 
oppose such meetings, despite the fact that many of the political leaders involved with 
these discussions were former supporters of the 1991 coup détat and Cedras regime. This 
progress was consummated on March 16, when Preval announced the composition of a 
new CEP that was acceptable to all parties.  
The fact that the interparty deadlock was resolved at all was a promising event. 
However, it had taken nearly two years and the shuting down of the legislature for the 
various actors in the Haitian party system to agree on how to overcome the disputed 
interparty competition of the 1997 elections. Clearly, the rules and nature of party 
competition were far from institutionalized. Furthermore, legislative elections were to be 
held again the following year, and these contests would also surely test Haitis fragile 
party and electoral systems. Would the political actors involved be able to learn from past 
debacles and forge a viable party system? 
1. 2000 Legislative Elections 
Haiti eventually conducted legislative elections in May 2000 and the high first 
round voter turnout offered hope that the Haitian party system had regained stability via 
an electorate that saw the CEP-run elections as a legitimate process. However, influenced 
by still too many parties and candidates on the ballot, the CEP chose not to abide by the 
law when counting the ballots. Perceiving that the leading party retained an unfair 
 80
advantage, opposition leaders lost faith in the fairness of the electoral process. By the 
final round, legitimacy had again been lost, as voter turnout was nearly non-existent. 
However, although the party system had degenerated into a de facto single-party system, 
a slight point of optimism was the convergence of many small opposition parties into a 
united front to counter Lavalas Family. Unfortunately, this occurrence was the only sign 
of further party system institutionalization to arise from these flawed elections. 
Despite a new CEP, many elites still saw the party and electoral systems as 
illegitimate. Even before the CEP had posted the initial results of the first round of voting 
on May 29, most parties had already rejected the forthcoming results. Similar to the 
reaction towards the 1997 elections, many again alleged that by counting only the top 
four contenders in each race, election officials had skewed the results by giving 
candidates from Lavalas Family an illegal advantage. The main point of contention was 
over the first round of Senate races, where of the 19 open seats, the CEP awarded 18 to 
Lavalas Family while staunchly refusing to conduct a recount.103  
Consequently, many Haitians and outside observers saw Lavalas Family as 
having unduly influenced the CEP somehow. As one political analyst offered, Lavalas 
isnt content just to win. It wants to obliterate the opposition.104 Allegations of 
impropriety against the CEP grew so heated that the Council Chairman, Leon Manus, 
fled to the United States rather than endorse the first-round results. The second and final 
round was held in July as Aristides Lavalas Family party would ultimately win more 
than 80 percent of local and parliamentary seats. 18 of 19 Senate seats had been secured, 
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while out of 82 deputy seats, Aristides party claimed 72, with many in the opposition 
leaning towards supporting Aristide. Out of 133 major mayoral offices throughout the 
nation, Lavalas Family held 106. As a pro-Aristide radio station broadcasted, The next 
governmentwill face no major challenge throughout its term.105 Clearly, the results of 
this election threatened to plunge Haiti into a single-party government and totally 
undermine the foundations of a competitive party system of government. 
The proliferation of parties and candidacies in the uninstitutionalized party system 
contributed again to electoral chaos. The fact that 29,000 candidates were competing for 
1,500 positions undoubtedly influenced the CEPs decision to implement again a 
simplified yet illegal tallying procedure. With an average number of nearly twenty 
candidates per single contest, the CEP was pressured to utilize an abbreviated method in 
order to achieve results in a timely manner. Regardless, opposition leaders alleged that 
Senate seats that were awarded without an absolute majority in the first round should 
have been subject to a second round since the process used was illegal and delegitimized 
the election. 
Initially, it appeared that the major parties had been able to establish stable roots 
in society. Although the campaign was marred by seven months of politically motivated 
violence that left fifteen people dead, election monitors estimated that an impressive 60% 
of the 4 million registered voters participated.106 This high voter turnout was the result of 
a number of factors, such as there was no organized boycott led by opposition parties.  
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Nonetheless, this thesis argues that this high voter turnout was less due to the 
party system per se and was driven primarily by the Haitian peoples desire to take 
control of their government and their nation. Haiti had not had a functioning government 
since June 1997, and Preval had ruled by decree since January 1999, following his 
suspension of Parliament. It had been over three years since the previous aborted 
elections, and as one U.S. editor believed, Haitians want to vote, and they showed this 
by turning out in record numbers on May 21.107 Ultimately, this level of participation 
raised hopes of a return to democratic government.108  
However, following the interparty fighting that occurred after the botched first 
round, voters quickly lost faith in parties and elections. Resultantly, voter turnout in the 
final round of voting was abysmally low. Lavalas Familys own estimates held the 
amount of participating voters in the second round at a mere five to ten percent. The 
Socialist official Victor Benoit, however, estimated the second round turnout at less than 
one percent of all eligible voters. OPL leader Pierre-Charles agreed with Benoit by 
declaring, The moment of truth has come, and the peoples abstention has shown the 
Lavalas partys unpopularity.109  
One point of optimism did arise within the party system in the wake of these 
elections. Unlike in the aftermath of the divisive 1997 legislative elections, opposition 
parties converged into a united front in order to confront the legislative representatives of 
an Aristide-led party. Fifteen opposition parties formed the coalition Group de 
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Convergence, and in so doing took a first step towards limiting the proliferation of parties 
that complicated electoral choices and governance. Under the supervision of an OAS 
delegation, opposition representatives met with those from Lavalas Family in mid-
October. The Convergence Coalition continued to call for a reexamination of the 
parliamentary elections while also demanding the organization of a new CEP to oversee 
the upcoming presidential vote set for November 26. Ariel Henry, a member of the 
Convergence Coalition, stated that without a new CEP, Its obvious that Nov. 26 
elections will not work.110  
2. November 2000 Presidential Elections 
By the end of the 2000 presidential election, the Haitian party system had totally 
collapsed. Despite Aristides attempts to pursue a more moderate agenda and offer 
substantial compromises to his opponents, these actors no longer had any trust in the CEP 
or the fairness of the party system. After Aristide won the election, the Haitian party 
system ceased to exist, as an opposing coalition set out to establish an alternative 
national regime outside of the constitutionally provided democratic system. 
Early in 2000, no other candidate [appeared] capable of denying Mr. Aristide in 
the December presidential election,111 and Aristide could have successfully campaigned 
on his populist agenda as he had done in 1990. However, he instead toned down his 
rhetoric and campaigned on a more moderate reform platform based on the principle that 
Haiti cannot isolate itself from the rest of the world. The geo-economic reality must 
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provoke a deep reflection to maintain equilibrium, maintain calm, and find a middle 
way.112  
This ideologic change away from his previous leftist views was the first major 
indication that Aristide was willing to campaign on a topic that did not directly appease 
or assist his constituency, primarily the poor masses. As a Haitian business leader stated, 
He does not need to make this policy change to win votes  he will win anyhow. So we 
accept this is a genuine change of course which will benefit the country.113 Furthermore, 
Aristide was willing to negotiate with his opponents and not shut them out of the 
Lavalas-dominated government. The day following the election Aristide declared, There 
will be a place for everyone in my government. To have a peaceful Haiti, the opposition 
is indispensable. It is part of our democratic fate.114 
However, despite Aristides moderated platform and conciliatory views, 
interparty relations suffered a complete breakdown. Attempts between Lavalas Family 
and the Convergence Coalition to find a compromised solution for the contested 
legislative elections collapsed. Resultantly, opposition parties would not give legitimacy 
to the Lavalas-dominated government, and much of Aristides opposition boycotted the 
presidential election. Such organized protests assisted Aristides efforts by contributing 
towards low voter turnout for the opposition, and on November 26, 2000, Aristide easily 
defeated six virtually unknown opponents.  
                                                 
112 James, 2000, p. 5. 
113 James, 2000, p. 5. 
114 Cable News Network, 2000. 
 85
In response, the Convergence Coalition declared that they would create a 
peaceful alternative to the legitimate, democratically elected Aristide administration.115 
Convergence naively offered an invitation for Lavalas Family representatives to attend an 
organizational meeting, which Lavalas representatives rejected. Senator Sonson Pierre 
stated, Lavalas Family cannot support the initiative of which the goal is to install an 
illegal government.116  
Convergence announced its own alternative president, 75-year old former 
presidential candidate, lawyer, and human rights activist Gerard Gourgue. Further adding 
tension to the situation, Evans Paul, a leading member of Convergence, called for the 
people to rise up and demonstrate their rejection of Aristide.117 Ultimately, this 
struggle for power outside of the party system posed a significant threat to the legitimacy 
of Haitian democracy. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
When comparing the current Haitian political environment with that of 1990-
1991, it is clear that Aristide remains the single most influential political force in Haiti. 
His presence, whether or not he is serving as president, is the continuation of Haitis long 
tradition of a single leader who rises above the political system. He is regarded by a 
majority of the population as the true, legitimate ruler of Haiti, even when someone else 
is serving as president. Although he was elected to office through democratic means, he 
will most likely remain the patriarch of Haitis body politic well into the future.  
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Such was the political environment on February 7, 2001, as Aristide was again 
inaugurated as Haitis President. Despite the many dilemmas facing Haitian democracy at 
the beginning of Aristides second presidency, Haiti must institutionalize its party 
system. Although the 15-party Convergence Coalition remains far from institutionalized 
and has been unable to gather significant popular support, it may someday consolidate 
into a single, effective political party as its leaders attempt to oppose Lavalas Family. 
However, this coalition must abandon the idea of forming an alternative government 
outside of the electoral system. Such a blatant disregard for the democratic process will 
only undermine the legitimacy of any success it may have in opposing what they perceive 
as an illegitimate one-party system.  
Separately, election boycotts, a political tactic that offers some limited benefits, 
are a sign of a weakly institutionalized system that lacks stability in the rules and the 
nature of interparty competition. While parties may feel the need to use boycotts as 
protest measures, the leaders of such parties must realize that boycotts are the symptoms 
of, and not the cure for, a non-institutionalized party system. Opposition parties should 
employ boycotts only as a last resort, and only after negotiations have failed. 
If a coalition of opposition parties, along with the rest of the Haitian party system, 
is to become institutionalized, outside assistance could be a beneficial factor. The 
international community should understand how foreign actions have influenced Haitian 
democratic consolidation. Furthermore, throughout Haitis history, no other international 
actor has had more of an impact upon Haiti than the United States. U.S. actions have not 
always been conducted with noble intentions, and the idea of furthering democratic 
values is a recent undertaking. Nonetheless, if Haiti is to consolidate her democracy, 
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Yankee assistance may be needed. In the following chapter, U.S. efforts in Haiti to 
further democracy and in particular instill an institutionalized party system will be 
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V. U.S. POLICIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION 
For nearly two centuries, the United States government has rarely designed its 
foreign policy towards Haiti with the goal of promoting democratic development. Only in 
the past decade, beginning in earnest during the Clinton administration, have U.S. policy 
makers seriously sought to promote democratic ideals in this Caribbean nation. This 
chapter examines U.S. policy in Haiti, with an emphasis placed on how U.S. actions have 
either promoted or hampered the development of an institutionalized party system. The 
years following the 1994 intervention are especially scrutinized, since it is during this 
period that the United States has made a committed effort to defend and assist in the 
institutionalization of Haitis political party system. This analysis of the successes and 
failures of past initiatives will help assess which policies will be successful in the future.  
A. U.S. POLICIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY: AN OVERVIEW 
During the Cold War, the containment of Communism overshadowed nearly all 
other U.S. foreign policies, including the promotion of democratic ideals. The perceived 
threat of the spread of international Communism often drove the United States to support 
and sponsor undemocratic regimes, since although many of these governments were 
authoritarian and oppressive, they served as allies against far-left political movements 
and Communist sympathizers. During and after the final days of the Cold War, however, 
the Bush and Clinton administrations found that many of these former allies had become 
political liabilities. The arrest of General Manuel Noriega following the 1989 invasion of 
Panama is the quintessential example of how some former U.S. allies quickly became 
foes as the Cold War rapidly thawed. 
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As the Soviet Union collapsed, President Bush foresaw a New World Order in 
which the United States, with the assistance of its allies, would suppress the aggressive 
initiatives of rogue states and other outlaw international regimes. However, the 
aggressive promotion of democracy would not be part of United States security strategy 
towards Haiti until President Clinton took office in January 1993. 
Although President Clinton swore to focus on the economy like a laser, and 
deal with foreign policy whenever it entered into play as it affects the economy, a 
policy of promoting global democracy eventually solidified.118 In his January 1994 State 
of the Union address, the President summed up his belief in the benefits of promoting 
democratic institutions abroad by reasoning, Democracies dont attack each other. He 
further elaborated, ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a 
durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.119  
President Clinton was not the first to embrace a concept that had already been 
termed the Democratic Peace. This liberal theory, usually attributed to Immanuel Kant, 
had already been accepted by many academics as well as influential national policy 
makers. For example, as early as 1989 one author touted this philosophy as the closest 
thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.120 Throughout 
his presidency, three core goals would consistently comprise his administrations national 
security strategy: 
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1. To enhance Americas security; 
2. To bolster Americas economic prosperity; and,  
3. To promote democracy and human rights abroad.121  
The President justified his inclusion of the third tenet by stating that without the 
successful achievement of this policy goal, U.S. national security and economic 
prosperity would face increased risk. In order to avoid such possible dilemmas, he stated,  
The United States works to strengthen democratic and free market 
institutions and norms in all countries, particularly those making the 
transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom 
and respect for human rights is not only just, but pragmatic. Our security 
depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, 
without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number 
of countries and threaten the stability of entire regions.122  
 
However, the Clinton administrations commitment to this tenet would be put to 
the test almost immediately due to the overthrow of a democratic government in the 
impoverished nation of Haiti. Historically, with few exceptions such as President 
Franklin Roosevelts Good Neighbor Policy, the United States has seldom promoted 
democratic ideals throughout Latin America. The United States embraced democracy 
inconsistently, preoccupied with competing security and economic interests.123 
Additionally, as with most governments with extensive bureaucracies, Internal obstacles 
further constrained U.S. effectiveness.124 Such internal obstacles and conflicts, such as 
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between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, would arise again 
as the U.S. dealt with the overthrow of Haitis Aristide government in 1991. Resultantly, 
a divided U.S. front towards Haiti existed before, during, and after the Cedras military 
regime was in power.  
Another enduring trend of U.S. policy towards Latin America nations is the 
primary focus on maintaining regional stability at the expense of democratic ideals. In 
order to accomplish this goal, some type of stable and functioning state within a country 
needs to remain intact. The United States has not always preferred to maintain specific 
regimes per se, but instead has concentrated on ensuring the continuance of state 
structures that provided national stability. In other words, U.S. policy towards political 
transitions in postwar Latin America has centered around the goal of securing regime 
changes that ensure the continuity of the state.125  
As long as the established entities of a state, such as the armed forces, legal 
apparatus, and financial systems remain intact, the U.S. has been willing to support 
democracies and authoritarian regimes alike. Nearly any Latin American administration 
that ensured continued cooperation with U.S. policies and ideals has almost always 
received U.S. support. Historically, continued economic and financial cooperation has 
been a central issue, as was the case with Fulgencio Batistas Cuban regime. In the 
postwar period, Washingtons tacit acceptance of any Latin American nation that was 
anti-Communist, regardless of the type of regime, is a perfect example of this fact. This 
pattern continued after the Cold War and into the third wave of international 
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democratization that followed. Unfortunately, many U.S. policy makers have interpreted 
a change from dictatorship to democratic regime, first and foremost, as a mechanism for 
preserving the state, not as a mode of promoting democratization and the values that 
accompany it.126  
B. U.S. POLICIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI: 1957-1990 
 
1. U.S. Policies during the Duvalier Regimes 
While the despicable acts of the Duvaliers were being conducted for nearly three 
decades, the United States ignored the dilemma, sometimes even supporting these 
barbarous regimes. Today, now that a very fragile democracy has been established in 
Haiti, the United States must correct the results of past policies that strangled the 
development and institutionalization of a political party system. 
Not only did the United States tacitly support the bloody Duvalier regime, but it 
was also with the assistance of U.S. policies that the Duvaliers were able to achieve 
national power. For example, the United States government assisted Duvalier in his 
successful presidential campaign. As the Haitian anthropologist Remy Bastien argued,  
In 1957 it was the opinion of the United States Department of State that 
Haiti needed a middle-class, middle-of-the-road reformer. Of the four 
candidates for the presidency, only one met the requirementsDr. 
Duvalier seemed the perfect choice.127  
 
After Papa Doc abolished Haitian democracy and established a dictatorship, the 
United States continued to support him because he was consistent in his anti-
Communism. It is now clear that the longevity of the Duvalier regime and the 
suppression of democracy was largely a U.S. creation and that he would never have 
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survived without the United States.128 Upon examination, it becomes clear that U.S. 
policies both directly and indirectly contributed to many of Duvaliers actions that 
undermined party institutionalization. 
 For example, approximately seven months after his election via democratic 
means, Duvalier assumed the role of dictator as he declared a state of siege and 
suspended all constitutional guarantees in order to silence his political opposition. Instead 
of condemning these undemocratic actions, the United States sent a Marine survey team 
led by a Major General to Port-au-Prince as guests of Duvalier. Their mission was to 
assess the feasibility of sending a much larger team to Haiti, ostensibly for the purpose 
of training [Duvaliers] army, but in actuality, it was a symbol of U.S. support.129 At 
the sight of the initial assessment team,  
The opposition panicked. Following the occupation emotions had run so 
high that for many years Marine guards at the American Embassy were 
not allowed to wear their regular uniforms. Now the Marines were 
returning to Duvaliers invitation to train his army! The psychological 
impact was important. He wanted the Marines as a token of U.S. 
support.130  
 
The Marine mission would eventually land and Duvalier would receive all of the 
U.S. support he could have wanted. With democracy suspended and with the clear 
backing of the United States, Duvalier concentrated his personal power and never 
considered reinstating democracy. This U.S.-assisted path towards authoritarianism, 
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which would eventually claim the lives of tens of thousands of political opponents, 
culminated in 1964 when Duvalier declared himself President for Life. 
When Papa Doc died in 1971, the United States could have intervened in order 
to promote democratic elections. Instead, Washington continued to support the right-wing 
Duvaliers, as U.S. Ambassador Clinton Knox personally supervised the transition from 
one Duvalier to another.131 Duvaliers personally selected successor, his nineteen-year 
old son, continued his fathers oppressive policies as the United States lent its support 
until it became apparent that his regime was unable to maintain control of the nation. 
2. U. S. Policies during Transition Years (1986-1990) 
Even after the end of the Duvalier regime in 1986, the United States continued to 
support the violent military regimes that followed, further undermining the chances for 
the emergence of an institutionalized party system. Washington backed these interim 
governments partly out of a belief that they were pursuing democratic policies and 
genuinely wanted to hand over power to an elected civilian government. In addition, 
support given to the Haitian leaders was also based on the US fear of the spread of 
communism in the region, particularly emanating from neighboring Cuba.132 
Consequently, no support of any kind was given to political opponents of the ruling 
military regime. Instead of lending support to opposition parties, in 1986 and 1987 
Washington praised the generals for liberalizing Haiti, doubled financial aid [to the 
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ruling government], and provided military advisers to train the Haitian army in riot 
control.133  
Those few policies that the U.S. did employ towards establishing Haitian 
democracy were both shortsighted and narrow in focus, and none addressed supporting 
political parties or the party system. With few exceptions, US democracy assistance to 
Haiti during this period was mainly directed at the holding of elections, and not at the 
many societal changes that were necessary for sustained democratic reform.134 Although 
some Washington policy makers would have liked to seen democracy take hold in Haiti, 
they were unwilling to dedicate the needed funds, energy, and attention to the problem to 
make this dream a reality. Dr. Georges Fauriol, Director of Latin American Studies, 
Center for Strategic and International Issues, testified before Congress, 
In 1986 Secretary Shultzs call for democracy in Haiti a week before 
Duvaliers collapse covered up the fact that this mission could not be 
accomplished in the near term. It catapulted American policy designs into 
the future without defining the near-term process. Washington paid the 
price for this lack of definition when the elections of late 1987 did not 
match expectations and when the short-lived Manigat government 
subsequently collapsed.135  
 
Fauriol claimed that further political dilemmas could be avoided if policy makers 
were willing to pursue a more vigorous policy of supporting Haitian democracy. 
However, such a policy would entail increased resources, political will, consistency, and 
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a long term commitment; assets that are not always strong points in the present 
framework of American politics and foreign policy.136  
Furthermore, the U.S. did not directly support any opposition figures or political 
parties that might have successfully pursued democratic change since no such actors 
apparently existed. When asked whom the U.S. could back as a reformist candidate, 
Fauriol stated, When it comes to developing a modernizing regime, the cast of 
characters is either limited or frightfully untested. This seriously limits U.S. options.137  
Complicating possible democratic assistance further, the United States saw other 
Haitian issues as more important than the establishing of a democratic government in the 
five years following the ouster of the Duvaliers. Primarily, the one recurring Haitian issue 
that drew more attention from Washington than any other was the contentious refugee 
problem. During the Cold War, the U.S. government welcomed nearly all refugees from 
Communist countries while either detaining or deporting thousands of refugees fleeing 
political oppression in Haiti. 
The refugee issue, which was the direct result of a lack of democratic freedoms 
and economic opportunity in Haiti, would remain Washingtons primary Haitian concern 
even after the brief democratic rule of Aristide ended in 1991. While the concept of 
supporting democracy was one of Clintons three primary national security goals, the 
arrival of Haitian refugees on U.S. shores would be a main force driving U.S. policy 
toward Haiti under both Bush and Clinton. 
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C. U.S. POLICIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI FOLLOWING 
1990 ARISTIDE ELECTION 
Immediately following Aristides landslide election, the United States officially 
offered Haitis new president its full support. Some conservative actors, however, 
distrusted the leftist priest and his policies and attempted to undermine his credibility. For 
these policy makers, the institutionalization of Haitis party system was of distant 
concern in comparison to the supposed economic and security threat that Aristide posed. 
Resultantly, after the Haitian leaders ouster, President Bush attempted to force Aristide 
to moderate his behavior in order to reach a compromise with the military regime. At the 
end of the Bush administration, the maintaining of a functioning state structure in Haiti 
was more important than furthering democratic institutions, while even the Clinton 
administration attempted to reinstate Aristide via negotiations with the military. 
Ultimately, however, when negotiations failed, President Clinton resorted to force in 
order to reinstate Aristide and uphold Haitis democracy. 
1. U.S. Policies toward Haiti during Initial Aristide Government 
Despite the U.S. governments poor record of relations with Haiti, the United 
States rallied behind Aristide after his presidential election. On December 18, 1990, two 
days after his election, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard 
Aronson stated that relations with Aristide got off to a good start. After meeting with 
the new Haitian President in Port-au-Prince, Aronson stressed that the United States 
looked forward to working with him.138  
However, not all U.S. government actors shared Secretary Aronsons optimism. 
Many worried about the low priority Aristides campaign gave to Haitian-U.S. relations. 
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For example, Aristide had proclaimed that his administration might be unwilling to 
accept U.S. assistance, claiming that past U.S. involvements had only resulted in misery 
for his people. Therefore, former President Jimmy Carter and former Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara argued that [Aristide] was violently anti-U.S. and hostile after 
meeting with the Haitian leader immediately after his election.139  
Furthermore, many of Aristides policy initiatives did not endear the new leader 
to many U.S. economic elites. Because of his populist views and initiatives, Aristide not 
only antagonized the Haitian business community but also U.S. investors with his 
proposals.140 Such sentiments were not confined to the U.S. economic sector, as many 
influential actors within the U.S. government also saw Aristide as a threat to their 
interests. For example, the CIA believed that Aristide and his far-left policies posed a 
threat to political and economic stability within the region.  
Whether or not CIA efforts had any impact on removing Aristide from office, a 
military junta in September 1991 ousted him from the Presidential Palace. It appeared 
that a peaceful, democratic transition of power had again eluded Haiti, as Aristides exile 
and the presence of General Raoul Cedras military regime would draw the United States 
once again into direct involvement with Haitian domestic political affairs.  
2.  U.S. Policies toward Haiti during Cedras Regime 
Despite initial support for President Aristides reinstatement, the Bush 
administration soon modified its position. It made it clear that while the United States 
fully supported the ideal of democracy, President Aristide himself did not share such 
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backing. On October 7, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater stated, It is the 
rule of democracy that we support. However, he continued, We dont know [if Aristide 
will return to power] in the sense that the government in his country is changing and 
considering any number of different possibilities.141  
The conservative elements of the U.S. media echoed such sentiments, reflecting 
the growing unease that many government officials had toward Aristide. A Washington 
Post editorial published the day before Fitzwaters comments argued, Returning 
President Aristide to Haiti is going to be difficult for reasons to which he himself has 
greatly contributed. This editorial correctly asserted that Aristides return will require, 
at the leasta kind of democracy that goes beyond mob rule.142 Simply reinstating 
Aristide would not solve the democratic dilemma in Haiti, and those who thought it 
would did not fully understand the dire political environment which existed.  
Even if some outside force quickly reasserted Aristide into Haiti, it is likely that 
the military would have eventually seized power again. One observer accurately summed 
that the army,  
Which for years has been a bastion of corruption and profiteering, 
considers itself virtually a fourth branch of the government in Haiti. Many 
officers and soldiers are known to regard the president as commander-in-
chief in name only, with no real authority over the military.143  
 
 Additionally, during the Cold War and into the Bush presidency, the Haitian 
militarys zeal for crushing leftist opponents had placed it on very friendly terms with the 
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CIA and the Department of Defense. President Bush, a former head of the CIA, did want 
to reestablish democracy in Haiti, but he did not want to antagonize the military in the 
process.144 Instead, his administration focused on achieving a negotiated settlement while 
ensuring the survival of an, albeit reformed, military institution with its external linkages 
to the Pentagon intact.145 
Resultantly, President Bush shied away from aggressive policies designed to force 
the military junta out of power. Taking little direct action, the U.S. was largely satisfied 
to allow the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) to take 
the lead in pursuing Aristides possible return. The Bush administrations only direct 
action against the Cedras regime was participating in the UN and OAS trade and oil 
embargo. However, within three months, many U.S. businesses almost entirely 
disregarded these agreements without any condemnation or action from Washington.146  
Meanwhile, Aristide languished in exile while Cedras entrenched himself as the 
leader of Haiti. U.S. policy under Bush accepted the status quo provided by the Cedras 
regime, in effect consisting of actions aimed at: 
1. Restoring political stability via a negotiated settlement between Aristide and 
the Haitian military; 
2. Maintaining access to cheap labor for U.S.-owned assembly plants in Haiti 
and throughout the region; and, 
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3. Professionalizing the Haitian police and military so as they could continue to 
control the civilian population; and above all else, 
4. Preventing an exodus of Haitian refugees destined for the United States.147  
As the 1992 presidential campaign began, the Bush administration attempted to 
minimize the amount of national attention concerning all aspects of the Haitian dilemma. 
However, the refugee problem rose to the forefront of U.S. public perception in April 
1992 when a surge of thousands of illegal Haitian immigrants began to arrive on U.S. 
shores, seeking asylum from the Cedras regimes repression. Bush, and initially, Clinton, 
were more concerned with this immediate dilemma than they were with the idea of 
reinstating a democratic Haitian government. In order to stem this growing tide, President 
Bush on May 24, 1994 announced a policy where, all Haitian refugees picked up at sea 
will be returned to Haiti.148  
  In an attempt to diffuse the growing refugee crisis, the Bush administration 
pressured Aristide to meet with Cedras Prime Minister Marc Bazin in order to negotiate 
his return to Haiti. In so doing, the United States could not hide its lack of respect for the 
results of a legitimate election, one of the four conditions that are required for the 
existence of an institutionalized party system. The symbolism of Aristides negotiating 
with Bazin, who was the distant second in votes behind him in the 1990 election, was not 
lost on some observers. Jean Casimir, Aristides Ambassador to Washington, pointed out 
that, The person who was resoundingly defeated is now being put forward by the 
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military-controlled government.149 Ultimately, however, negotiations began and would 
continue even after Bush stepped down as President. This approach towards pressuring 
Aristide into negotiations clearly signaled that at the end of the Bush administration the 
maintaining of a functioning state structure in Haiti was more important than furthering 
democratic institutions. 
 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton stated that if elected he would, 
turn up the heat and try to restore the elected government.150 The former governor won 
the election, and during the first months of his presidency negotiations between Aristide 
and Cedras regime continued, as Clinton offered more support for Aristides position 
than had his predecessor. By April, however, discussions stalled over one primary issue: 
amnesty for the military junta regarding alleged human rights violations. Under 
continuing pressure by the U.S. government, however, Aristide and the Haitian military 
continued to negotiate an end to the standoff. The culmination of these negotiations was 
the July 1993 Governors Island Agreement, a compromise that offered a working 
solution. This comprehensive 10-part pact included the following major stipulations that 
both Aristide and Cedras agreed upon: 
1. President Aristide would return to Haiti on October 30, 1993; 
2. General Cedras and his allies would be allowed to retire with Aristide 
selecting their replacements; 
3. An amnesty granted to the members of the coup for any alleged crimes; and, 
most importantly for the institutionalization of the party system, 
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4. The organization, under the auspices of the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States (OAS), of a political dialogue between the 
representatives of the political parties represented in the parliament.151  
This fourth item was extremely significant insofar as the future of democracy in 
Haiti was concerned, since two international diplomatic bodies, the UN and the OAS, 
were now becoming directly involved in the fate of the nations democratic process. 
Under this agreement, representatives of these organizations would mediate an agreement 
between Haitian political parties that would result in a political truce between all parties 
and an improved ability of Parliament to operate more efficiently.152 Such international 
involvement in Haitis political system would tie the democratic fate of Haiti directly to 
the prestige of those nations that would become involved via the overseeing 
organizations. In so doing, the hope existed that such a mediating presence might greatly 
assist in the institutionalization of the Haitian party system.  
Shortly after the signing of this Agreement, nearly all involved parties initiated its 
implementation. Parliament reconvened and ratified Robert Malval as Prime Minister. 
Resultantly, UN sanctions were suspended on August 27, 1993. This optimistic trend 
would not last, however, as the USS Harlan County, carrying the first troops of the UN 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), was met by a violent mob in Port-au-Prince on October 11 
and was turned away. From that moment, the Governors Island Agreement was 
effectively dead,153 as Cedras violated every part of the brokered deal. It mattered 
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little that Aristide, as well as the United States and the UN, meticulously complied with 
the agreements terms.154  
Despite the collapse of the Governors Island Agreement and continuing political 
violence in Haiti, the Clinton administration continued to pursue a compromise between 
Aristide and the Cedras regime. In order to achieve success via this strategy, Aristide was 
pressured to play nice with the military junta and his opponents in the parliament and 
agree to concessions that might contribute to a peaceful settlement. Despite his agreement 
to the failed Governors Island Agreement, many in Washington saw Aristide as unwilling 
to compromise. Resultantly, and because a negotiated solution would be preferable to an 
invasion, there was tremendous pressure on Aristide to negotiate some kind of power-
sharing arrangements with the generals, to give priority to national reconciliation.155 
However, by May 1994, it became clear that it was the Haitian generals who were 
uncompromising, not Aristide. Resultantly, President Clinton increased the embargo and 
decided to use force in order to reinstate Aristide.  
If Aristide had agreed to a settlement that allowed the military junta to retain a 
role in a power-sharing agreement, serious damage would have been done to the 
institutionalization of the Haitian party system. Such a solution would have sent a clear 
message that the military had the right to seize political power as they saw fit. Therefore, 
Aristide was correct in his unwillingness to share political power with the military.  
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D. U.S. POLICIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI FOLLOWING 
INTERVENTION 
This thesis argues that the United States did not consider the development of an 
institutionalized party system as a long-term policy goal in Haiti at the time of Aristides 
reinstatement as president. However, in the years following the intervention, the actions 
of many U.S. policy makers, especially the State Department and other diplomats in the 
Clinton administration, have in fact directly contributed to institutionalizing the party 
system.  
The short-term objectives of the U.S.-led intervention included stopping human 
rights violations, ending the threat of a mass refugee exodus, and demonstrating that the 
United States kept its international commitments. Most importantly, democracy was 
restored as the lawfully elected President was returned to office. Not all policy makers 
concurred with these goals, however, such as the CIA, who did not believe that it was in 
U.S. security interests to see Aristide reinstated. 
After Aristide was returned to the Presidential Palace and the military phase of the 
intervention was concluded, the Department of State instituted programs aimed at 
supporting free and fair elections and funding democratic assistance programs. 
Additionally, President Clinton and other policy makers, both Democrat and Republican, 
maintained diplomatic pressure on Haitian elites in a dedicated attempt to further 
institutionalize the Haitian political party system. 
1. Democracy Assistance Programs: Elections and Parties 
Ultimately, the amount of money spent towards furthering democracy overseas is 
no guarantee of success, nor can one hope to ascertain the actual results based solely on 
such data. Neither the best of intentions, nor large amounts of capital (both economic and 
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political), can guarantee results. Nonetheless, financial aid has been a critical component 
of keeping democracy alive in Haiti following the reinstatement of democracy in 1994. 
For example, in 1995, over 75% of all capital flow into Haiti was from official sources 
either in the form of loans or direct aid.156 
The Department of State, particularly through USAID, is the primary government 
organization that funds democratic assistance programs. These programs are designed to 
further democracy by directly funding foreign governments and foreign political actors so 
they can pursue various reform efforts, including steps that institutionalize their political 
party systems. Additionally, State Department officials, USAID representatives, and 
funded NGO members may become directly involved in the implementation of some 
programs.  
U.S. financial and personnel support for free and fair elections is a common 
example of a Department of State democracy program. For example, during the 1995 
Haitian legislative and presidential elections, the U.S. spent approximately $18.8 million 
towards technical assistance, providing observers, and paying election officials salaries. 
Furthermore, U.S. officials, and NGO members paid by the U.S. government, assisted in 
the observation of the elections and increased the credibility of the electoral process.157  
Additionally, in 1995 alone, three U.S. NGOs spent $2.12 million dollars of 
USAID Democracy Enhancement Project grants on Haitian election activities, with a 
significant portion of this funding earmarked for institutionalizing political parties. The 
NGO that received the most funding, the National Democratic Institute for International 
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Affairs (NDI), conducted political party and consensus-building seminars, and in 
conjunction with the International Republican Institute (IRI), also trained poll observers 
from multiple political parties. Perhaps most impressively, in August 1995, NDI sent 
three Haitian political party leaders to an NDI-sponsored conference in Africa on 
managing election-related disputes.158 Clearly, the U.S. government is directly involved 
in promoting party system institutionalization in Haiti. 
Furthermore, among all of the nations in Latin America that receive U.S. financial 
assistance for democracy programs, no other nation has received more than Haiti since 
1995.159 In the final quarter of 1994 following the reinstatement of Aristide, the State 
Department alone spent nearly $22 million towards supporting this reestablished 
democracy. Although the documentation of funds spent strictly on democracy programs 
worldwide was not initiated until 1998, USAID information shows that Haiti received 
more overall funding assistance than any other Latin American nation between 1995-
1997. During these years, Haiti received an average of over $107 million per year, an 
amount that would be only slightly increased during 1998-2000.160 
While strengthening democratic institutions has remained a top U.S. priority in 
Haiti since the intervention, the focus of State Department efforts has recently shifted. 
Since 1998, a smaller percentage of funds has been going towards democratic 
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consolidation efforts while an increased percentage of funds have been routed towards 
economic assistance and other programs. As the Department of State reported, 
Beginning in 1999, we will shift our strategic focus in Haiti from 
immediate restoration of democracy and economic recovery to longer-
term, poverty reduction programs geared to build up municipal institutions 
and capabilities.161  
 
Resultantly, from 1998 to 2000, democratic development programs lost $6.46 
million in funds, while the amount of funding for economic development, over the same 
period, increased by $7.88 million (See Table 1.). Although funding for democracy 
programs in Haiti decreased, this nation still receives the largest amount of U.S. financial 
aid for this goal than any other nation in the hemisphere. 
 While poverty-reduction is a critical necessity in Haiti, should the State 
Department pursue such programs at the expense of assisting in the development of the 
Haitian party system and other democratic institutions? Granted, Haiti is the poorest 
nation in the Western Hemisphere, and as of 2000 an astounding 45% of its wealth lies in 
the hands of the richest one percent of the population. Clearly, every nation that hopes to 
achieve a basic level of democratic consolidation must have a sound economic 
infrastructure, and if any regional nation needs economic support, it is Haiti. The 
industrial sector employs approximately only 20,000 Haitians, while there are over 2.5 
million people (70% of which are officially unemployed) living in Port-au-Prince alone. 
In a poverty-stricken nation like Haiti, economic aid and investment funds are needed in 
order to build an infrastructure and industrial base, yet such development requires 
funding that is obviously not available within the nation. 
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Table 1.  Federal Budget (International Affairs): FY 19982000 ($ thousands).  
              FY 1998 (Actual)          FY 1999 (Estimate)       FY 2000 (Request) 
Total, International 
























































































Unfortunately, private actors will not be willing to invest funds into a non-
functional economy. Therefore, private funds from either international loan agencies such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), or from nation-to-nation aid must be provided in order to stimulate basic 
economic development. As Professor Starr of Mexico states, 
For countries such as Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, and Nicaraguathe 
obstacles to development are more fundamental than those of their richer 
neighbors. These regions lack the basic physical and human infrastructure 
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essential for productive private investment. Until the time-cosuming and 
difficult process of building this infrastructure is complete, the private 
sector will be a minor source of development finance at best162  
  
Nonetheless, is it prudent to decrease the amount that goes toward strengthening 
democratic institutions, especially when not all of the funds earmarked for democracy 
programs benefits the institutionalization of the party system? For example, according to 
information provided on the USAID website, of the $16,815,000 requested for FY 2000 
democracy programs, $4,575,000 (27%) was to go towards strengthening law 
enforcement and the judicial system. The remaining $12,240,000 was for the program 
designed to promote more meaningful inclusion of citizens in the process of democratic 
governance.163  
While no further monetary breakdown exists for this program vis-à-vis distinct 
programs, the main goal of the overall program would incorporate party system 
institutionalization, primarily via the aim of increasing Haitian citizens participation at 
all levels: elections, justice, national and local government and civil society.164 And 
although no evidence was given that political parties had become more institutionalized, 
social organizations, which have been shown in an earlier chapter to simplify the 
recruitment efforts of political parties, have benefited. For example, during FY 1999, 
More than 1,200 civil society organizationshave constructively engaged in policy 
discussions and debates on the topics of decentralization, poverty alleviation and the 
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environment. Associations and federations of local officials exist and are spearheading 
important decentralization initiatives.165  
Ostensibly, an improvement in the financial state of the Haitian people should 
create a more politically perceptive constituency, in turn leading to self-driven 
democratic development. However, unless international actors continue to assist in the 
development of democratic institutions such as the party system, elite politicians may 
increase and centralize their power within the government. Therefore, further reductions 
in funding for democracy assistance programs should be viewed with caution.  
2.  Diplomatic Efforts 
Many aspects of United States diplomacy vis-à-vis Haiti in the years since 
Aristides return have contributed to a further institutionalization of the party system. For 
example, the way in which the United States interacted with Aristide in late 1994, as he 
hinted that he might pursue an unconstitutional, three-year extension of his presidency, 
greatly supported the institutionalization of the Haitian party system. On November 23, 
the day before Aristide was to address a crowd of Lavalas supporters and possibly 
announce his candidacy, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake flew to Port-au-Prince 
and met with Aristide. At their meeting, Lake reminded Aristide of his pledge to the 
United States prior to Operation Uphold Democracy not to seek reelection.166 The 
following week, the U.S. government reiterated its understanding that Aristide would not 
run, as Lake stated We expect him to leave.167  
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Two U.S. senators, any of whom often exert commensurate power as the 
executive concerning foreign policy matters, also publicly pressured Aristide to step 
down. Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) stressed, We risked a lot of lives down there. If he 
doesnt support democracy we shouldnt support him. Senator Phil Graham, (R-Tex.) 
said that if Aristide violated his agreement to step down, we should demand that he step 
down.168 The same day that these quotes were published, November 27, due primarily 
to U.S. diplomatic pressure, Aristide announced that he indeed would step down at the 
end of his term. I am leaving February 7, he simply relayed to an interviewer.169  
If Aristides presidency had been extended by three years, the party system would 
have been placed in serious jeopardy. It would have been clear that the ambitions of 
Aristide still dominated his party, further undermining the roots and legitimacy of the 
entire party system. Most importantly, if the Haitian Constitution had been either 
dismissed or distorted in order to cater to a popular leader, the rules of interparty 
competition would have been totally destabilized. Instead, as one editorial read, By 
stepping down, Aristide will allow the impoverished Caribbean island nation to continue 
moving towards democracyRather than thwart the democratic process, Aristide should 
use his considerable popularity to ensure the peaceful transfer of power.170  
President Clintons administration and the Department of State assisted the 
institutionalization of Haitis party system during the Preval presidency through 
supporting sound initiatives while also condemning undemocratic actions by the 
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government and opposition parties alike. The most critical diplomatic efforts were 
undertaken during the two-year political deadlock following the April 1997 legislative 
elections and controversial CEP handling of those contests. The United States applied 
pressure on all parties, including members of both the Preval administration and 
opposition leaders, to seek a compromised solution to the deadlock. Without this 
continuous diplomatic involvement and support for negotiations, there would have been a 
greater chance that the party system could have permanently collapsed into violence. 
Under George W. Bushs administration, the United States has continued to decry 
actors in Haiti that have attempted to circumvent the electoral process. One example is 
the Convergence Alliance and its establishing of a provincial government in protest 
against alleged voting irregularities during the 2000 presidential elections. Although this 
contest was flawed and the U.S. voiced its objection to a lack of compromise by the 
ruling party, the United States gave public legitimization to the democratic process by 
rejecting the tactics of the opposition. In February 2001, Bush sent a letter to Aristide 
supporting his administration and stressing the importance of the Lavalas government to 
respect an eight-point agreement signed between Aristide and representatives of former 
President Clinton designed to strengthen government institutions.171 Concurrently, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Dean Curran stated that the alternative government would not 
advance the prospects for dialogue or a solution to the political crisis.172  
However, some policy makers in Washington have assumed positions that if 
pursued would undermine the institutionalization of the Haitian party system. In 
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particular, those who would see the Convergence Alliance as a democratic alternative 
to the Aristide government are tragically mistaken. Several conservative Congressmen, 
most notably Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), are the greatest sources of U.S. support for 
Convergence.173  
Senator Helms, the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
and his allies in Washington, including former Chairman of the House Foreign Relations 
Committee, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and Representative Porter Goss (R-FL) possess 
considerable political power. These individuals described the Haitian Presidential 
election of November 2000 as a sham election with the sole purpose of delivering 
absolute control over Haitis government to Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.174 Instead of 
trying to aid Haitis electoral system and pursue reforms to institutionalize the party 
system, they would rather embrace the Convergence Alliance. These individuals would 
claim Convergence is a democratic alternative, yet it is an organization with modest 
popular standing and no legal mandate that only a fair election can provide.175  
No matter how much some U.S. policy makers dislike or mistrust President 
Aristide, by supporting an unconstitutional and illegitimate alternative, these individuals 
threaten to undermine not only the party system, but also the entire fate of Haitian 
democracy. Convergence has a right to protest the government and try to negotiate the 
rules of the electoral system, as any party or coalition within an institutionalizing party 
system enjoys. However, the establishment of an alternative government outside of the 
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national electoral system stands in direct opposition to the role of political parties within 
a democratic government. Every time political leaders in Washington lend support to this 





Factors that inhibit the development of an institutionalized party system remain in 
Haiti, and it is doubtful that this poor nation will be able to overcome these obstacles 
without outside assistance. This final chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and 
offers recommendations as to how the United States may assist Haiti in overcoming the 
present inhibiting factors against an institutionalized party system. 
If inchoate democracies worldwide are to achieve democratic consolidation, then 
the institutionalization of these nations various government systems, including party 
systems, must be attained. However, difficulties will inevitably be encountered within 
any nation in their struggle to institutionalize their party system. Such negative factors 
include the lack of organization in society around shared interests, the absence of initial 
party development during the earliest stages of state building, and negative elite behavior 
such as oppression against political opponents and corrupt practices. 
As this thesis examined the history of the Haitian political system from the fight 
for independence to the 1994 intervention, it became clear that all of these factors have 
hindered the development of a political party system. Haiti was a nation dominated by 
violent and ruthless leaders who cared little for either democracy or justice. Such political 
leaders, most notably the Duvaliers in the latter half of the twentieth century, created a 
political environment that continues to undermine the efforts of political reformers who 
attempt to pursue democratic consolidation and party system institutionalization in Haiti. 
More recently, President Aristide has also contributed to the weakening of the 
Haitian party system. Aristide, the central figure in modern Haitis democracy, is a man 
whose personal charisma rapidly carried him to the presidency in both 1990 and 2000. 
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Despite the fact that Aristide attained victory in legitimate elections, these victories were 
products of a non-institutionalized party system. Aristides actions and relations with the 
other sectors of the government, including his own and other parties, contributed to 
political turmoil that ultimately damaged the progress of democratic consolidation in 
Haiti.  
Since the 1994 intervention, Haitis political party system has failed to achieve 
institutionalization. Electoral rules have been continuously debated as opposition parties 
boycotted elections and the legislature collapsed. Ultimately, however, one of the primary 
factors behind this failure was the actions of Haitian political elites. The fact that both 
President Aristide and his opponents have been unwilling to make compromises in order 
to develop the necessary rules and framework for an institutionalized party system has 
contributed directly to the dire political situation present today.  
Furthermore, United States policy toward Haiti has rarely been based upon 
promoting democratic ideals. Throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth 
centuries, the United States placed far more importance on securing economic and 
security interests than supporting democratic regimes or political actors. The open 
support of the brutal Duvalier regimes during the Cold War is the most blatant example 
of the United States sacrificing democratic ideals in order to pursue more immediate 
goals such as the defeat of international Communism. 
However, since the United States committed to implementing armed force in 
order to reinstate President Aristide in 1994, many policy makers in Washington have 
increased their support for furthering Haitian democracy. Through the efforts of many 
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actors, but primarily the State Department and USAID, the United States has continued to 
assist not any particular regime or individual, but instead the entire Haitian democratic 
system. Primarily, economic and financial support for Haitis democratic government and 
independent organizations such as political parties following the intervention has 
achieved successes despite the efforts of some U.S. political leaders to undermine Haitis 
democratically elected leaders. 
As Haiti looks to the future, it is evident that with outside assistance and positive 
change on behalf of political elites within this small nation, party system 
institutionalization can progress. The following are recommendations for those U.S. 
policy makers who would attempt to support Haitian democracy and the 
institutionalization of this nations political party system. 
Nothing can change the absence of initial party development in Haiti during the 
earliest phases of state building. Furthermore, Haiti has suffered centuries of violent and 
oppressive history, resulting in a predatory political culture that for nearly two hundred 
years dominated the government. Such ingrained obstacles cannot be disposed of quickly. 
The best way in which the United States can deal with this factor is by acknowledging 
how the past environment of abused power still undermines the Haitian electorates 
confidence in political and economic elites. An institutionalization of the party system 
will almost assuredly have to come about gradually, since time will be required for all 
Haitians to develop trust and confidence in their party system.  
Additionally, because of the repetitive misfortune that Haitis political system has 
endured over the past two centuries, the United States should investigate the idea of 
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helping Haiti restructure its system of representative government. This thesis argues that 
the very structure of Haitis electoral system may be an impediment to party system 
institutionalization. In the Haitian government, a winner-takes-all system exists where 
only by winning a majority in any given district can a party win representation in the 
legislature. The result in Haiti is that a single political party commands the allegiance 
of a substantial majority but is resented by powerful minorities.176 
Consequently, Aristides Lavalas Family has secured an overwhelming majority 
in the national legislature, as opposition parties, even when they represent a significant 
minority, are shut out from the democratic process. A possible solution would be to 
amend the 1987 Constitution so that a proportional representation system is established in 
which seats are distributed in proportion to the percentage of votes attained. While this 
would still give Aristides party a majority in both houses, at least other parties would be 
able to have more proportional involvement in the national government. Under these 
circumstances, opposition parties would see they have a chance to gain at least some 
seats during nationwide elections. With the prospect of gaining a meaningful stake in 
democracy, political parties would most likely not be as willing to boycott elections, 
thus furthering the democratic process for all Haitians.177  
Another inhibiting factor is a lack of social organization via shared interests. 
Stagnant economic development, which in turn results in a lack of an organized middle 
class and a disenfranchised electorate, is the primary continuing cause behind this 
                                                 
176 Reding, 1996, p. 21. 
177 Reding, 1996, p. 22. 
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handicap in Haiti. Currently, overcoming this factor is the focus of State Department and 
USAID efforts, and this area of development will require sustained effort and will most 
likely take many years to achieve lasting, meaningful change. This thesis recommends 
that the United States maintain both financial and political support for the Haitian 
government in its efforts to improve the nations economic structure, and thus overcome 
an obstacle that has hindered party system institutionalization. 
The final, and most critical, factor that Haiti must overcome is the corrupt and 
selfish interests of political elites. A lack of Haitian elite support for an institutionalized 
party system, even after the democratic elections of 1990, hampered its development. The 
rules of the electoral system were not stabilized, party roots did not develop successfully, 
and it became clear that individuals ambitions often manipulated parties in order to 
pursue personal political agendas. It is imperative that the United States continues in its 
efforts to hold Haitian elites accountable to the ideals and rules of their democratic 
system in order for party system institutionalization to continue. 
An added benefit of addressing this factor is that when elites do improve the way 
in which they act within a party system, immediately beneficial results can occur. While 
no one can change history, and it may take years for social organizations to demonstrate 
significant improvements, elite actions can effect a nations political system 
instantaneously. However, isolated improvements in the actions of elites will not be 
sufficient for party system institutionalization. Ultimately, while foreign assistance can 
help, Haitian political leaders themselves must be willing to place the political party 





Figure 1. Political Map of Haiti178 
 
 
                                                 
178 Map copied from Mapquest.com website. 
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